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1.0 Notification and Authorization
In March 2005, Mr. Michael Blythe of the Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE) requested the
Director, Systems Analysis and Concepts Directorate at the Langley Research Center (LaRC) to
submit a plan for responding to Diaz Action #4 from the report A Renewed Commitment to
Excellence: An Assessment of the NASA Agency-wide Applicability of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board Report [ref. 1].
"Develop a standard for the development, documentation, and operation of models and
simulations.
1. Identify best practices to ensure that knowledge of operations is captured in the user
interfaces (e.g., users are not able to enter parameters that are out of bounds).
2. Develop process for tool verification and validation, certification, re-verification,
revalidation, and recertification based on operational data and trending.
3. Develop standard for documentation, configuration management, and quality
assurance.
4. Identify any training or certification requirements to ensure proper operational
capabilities.
5. Provide a plan for tool management, maintenance, and obsolescence consistent with
modeling/simulation environments and the aging or changing of the modeled
platfonn or system.
6. Develop a process for user feedback when results appear unrealistic or defy
explanation."
The implementation plan was developed by the Development Team at LaRC, led by Mr. Thomas
Zang. The plan was approved by the OCE on April 19, 2005, and fiscal year (FY) 05 funding
was provided by the OCE in May 2005.
In September 2005, the Program Analysis and Evaluation Office reviewed all the Diaz Actions
and recommended that Diaz Action #4 be completed.
On October 23, 2005, Mr. Gregory Robinson requested the NASA Engineering and Safety
Center (NESC) to assume sponsorship and oversight of this activity. This assessment officially
began on January 13, 2006, under an informal plan from the Development Team. The formal
plan for the FY 07-08 activities was developed by the Topic Working Group, which was formed
in February—June 2006 under the auspices of the NASA Technical Standards Working Group.
The NESC Review Board (NRB) approved this formal plan on March 29, 2007. The final report
was presented to the NRB on November 20, 2008.
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4.0 Executive Summary
After the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report [ref. 3], the NASA
Administrator at that time chartered an executive team (known as the Diaz Team) to identify the
CAIB report elements with Agency-wide applicability, and to develop corrective measures to
address each element. The following report documents the chronological development and
release of an Agency-wide Standard for Models and Simulations (M&S) (NASA Standard 7009)
in response to Action #4 from the report, "A Renewed Commitment to Excellence: An Assessment
of the NASA Agency-wide Applicability of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report,
January 30, 2004" [ref. 1]. This action was to "Develop a standard for the development,
documentation, and operation of models and simulations". The NASA Chief Engineer at that
time augmented the detailed description of this action in a memo to the NASA Engineering
Management Board (EMB) dated September 1, 2006 (Appendix A). The major addition to the
objectives of Diaz Action #4 was the inclusion of the standard method to assess the credibility of
M&S. This is referred to as the "credibility assessment scale."
The first part of this action—the development of a draft standard for M&S—was accomplished
by the Development Team. After some modifications by the Topic Working Group, this draft
was issued as the NASA Interim M&S Standard for M&S, NASA-STD-(I)-7009 [ref. 4] on
December 1, 2006. Subsequently, the Topic Working Group made extensive revisions to the
credibility assessment scale and then to the M&S Standard itself in response to the NASA-wide
review. Their product was the Revised M&S Standard, which was delivered to the NASA
Technical Standards Program Office on November 16, 2007. This underwent additional revisions
as a result of the EMB review, and that final document became the Permanent NASA Standard
for M&S, NASA-STD-7009 [ref. 5] in July 2008.
In the course of the Interim, Revised, and Permanent M&S Standards development, review, and
release, a number of Development Team and Topic Working Group findings, observations,
recommendations, alternate viewpoints, and lessons learned were identified. These are directed
to the OCE and located in Sections 9.0, 10.0, and 12.0.
The following Development Team and Topic Working Group recommendations are made:
R-1. NASA should integrate the M&S Standard into the NASA guidance hierarchy.
R-2. NASA should coordinate with other organizations and professional societies to
further mature the M&S Standard.
R-3. NASA should sponsor development of Recommended Practices Guides.
R-4. NASA should re-assess the requirements on recommended practices that were
removed from the Interim M&S Standard.
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R-5. NASA should refine how submodels are treated in the credibility assessment scale.
R-6. Information regarding credibility assessment scale usage should be collected to
determine effectiveness and provide data for further revision.
R-7. NASA should clarify the operational meaning of the term "consensus" in NASA
Interim Directive on Interim NASA Technical Standards.
Topic Working Group Recommendations:
R-8. NASA should sponsor the development of Recommended Practices Guides along
disciplinary lines. This responsibility might best be delegated to the NASA
Technical Fellows.
R-9. NASA should collect data on the scope decisions, the cost impact, and the credibility
assessment scale usage of the M&S Standard.
R-10. NASA should develop, by application domain, an M&S "validation lessons learned"
database.
R-11. An NPD and/or NPR should call out the M&S Standard.
R-12. Centers should share with each other their plans and other guidance for
implementation of the NI&S Standard.
5.0 Assessment Plan
This assessment consisted of two phases, with the major activities illustrated in Figures 5.0-1 and
5.0-2. In Phase 1 (May 2005 - August 2006), the Development Team from LaRC performed
background research, formulated the general approach, and developed the first three versions of
the M&S Standard. An informal review of the second draft was conducted which solicited
comments from the Centers. In Phase 2 (August 2006 - November 2007), the Topic Working
Group, with membership from all Centers except for DFRC revised Version 3 into Version 4,
which became the Interim NASA M&S Standard for M&S; oversaw the roll-out of the M&S
Standard at their Centers; fostered the pilot studies and formal comments at their Centers: and
revised the Interim M&S Standard into the version submitted for EMB approval as Version 5. A
substantial part of this work involved consensus on a single credibility assessment scale.
There were three principal documents produced during this task. The term Interim M&S
Standard is used herein to refer to the Interim NASA Standard for Models and Simulations [ref.
4], and discussed in Section 7.3. The term Revised JW&S Standard refers to Version 5 approved
by the Topic Working Group in response to the Agency-wide review discussed in Section 7.5.
The term Permanent JW&S Standard refers to the subsequent version [ref. 5] fornially issued in
July 2008 that included changes resulting from the EMB review discussed in Section 7.6.
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Figure 5.0-2. Phase 2 of the M&S Standard Development
Phase 1 made extensive use of external consultants from the Department of Energy (DoE), the
Department of Defense (DoD), NASA contractors, and academia to determine the state-of-the-
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practice in M&S guidance (including, but not limited to, formal standards), and to solicit
comments on the first two versions of the M&S Standard. Phase 2 utilized weekly web-based
meetings and five face-to-face workshops to resolve key issues on the scale and the disposition
of formal comments. The first three of these workshops utilized the services of a trained
facilitator, which proved useful in focusing and documenting the discussions and decisions.
Decision-making by the Topic Working Group in Phase 2 was more formalized than it was by
the Development Team in Phase 1. The quorum of voting members required for a Topic
Working Group decision was 6 (of 9) voting members. The Topic Working Group made most of
its decisions by a supermajority rule (e.g. if 8 voting members were present, then a 6-2 vote was
decisive, but a 5-3 (or 4-4) vote required additional discussion). Furthermore, the Topic Working
Group eventually added rules to curb the temptation to revisit previous formal decisions: (1) a
formal motion plus a second was required even to begin discussion of a previous decision, and
(2) overturning a previous decision required a supermajority in favor of the overturn.
The original plan submitted by the Development Team called for submittal of a draft M&S
Standard to OCE by April 2006 (later extended to July 2006). This draft would then undergo the
normal review process for NASA Standards. In June 2006, the NASA Chief Engineer
deterniined that the M&S Standard should be issued as a NASA interim standard in Fall 2006,
and then undergo the normal review process. Issuance as an interim M&S Standard required
consensus approval by a Topic Working Group under the auspices of the NASA Technical
Standards Working Group. Phase 1 ended when the Development Team submitted Version 3 as
their final deliverable in August 2006. Phase 2 commenced with the Topic Working Group
review of Version 3 that same month.
(In this report, the term NASA Chief Engineer is only used to refer to the individual in that
position, whereas the terns Office of the Chief Engineer refers generically to those individuals in
the OCE with direct oversight responsibility for this activity.)
6.0 Problem Description and Scope
This section summarizes the written guidance provided for the development of the M&S
Standard.
6.1 Columbia Accident Investigation Board
The CAIB report [ref. 3] contained four findings that were relevant to the development of the
M&S Standard:
"F.6.3-10: The Team's assessment of possible tile damage was performed using an
impact simulation that was well outside Crater's test database. The Boeing analyst was
inexperienced in the use of Crater and the interpretation of its results. Engineers with ex-
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tensive Thermal Protection System expertise at Huntington Beach were not actively
involved in determining if the Crater results were properly interpreted."
"F.6.3-11: Crater initially predicted tile damage deeper than the actual tile depth, but
engineers used their judgment to conclude that damage would not penetrate the densified
layer of tile. Similarly, RCC damage conclusions were based primarily on judgment and
experience rather than analysis."
"F6-3-13: The assumptions (and their uncertainties) used in the analysis were never
presented or discussed in frill to either the Mission Evaluation Room or the Mission
Management Team."
"F.10.1-4: The FAA and U.S. space launch ranges have safety standards designed to
ensure that the general public is exposed to less than a one-in-a-million chance of serious
injury from the operation of space launch vehicles and unmanned aircraft."
These findings led to the Space Shuttle Program-specific recommendation:
"R3.8-2: Develop, validate, and maintain physics-based computer models to evaluate
Thermal Protection System damage from debris impacts. These tools should provide
realistic and timely estimates of any impact damage from possible debris from any source
that may ultimately impact the Orbiter. Establish impact damage thresholds that trigger
responsive corrective action, such as on-orbit inspection and repair, when indicated."
6.2 A Renewed Commitment to Excellence: An Assessment of the NASA
Agency-wide Applicability of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board Report
In its general discussion of these issues, the A Renewed Comna tinent to Excellence: An
Assessment of the NASA Agenc y-wide Applicability of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board Report, hereafter referred to as the "Diaz Team report" [ref. 1] suggested:
"All programs should produce, maintain, and validate models to assess the state of their
systems and components. These models should be continually updated and validated
against experimental and operational data to determine appropriate courses of action and
repair. The value of the models should be assessed with respect to their ability to support
decision making in a timely way so as not to lead the decision maker to a conflict
between costly action versus effective action in the interest of safety or mission success."
"Personnel need to be adequately trained in model use, limitations, and escalation
procedures when issues arise. Engineers, when faced with results that defy "reality
checks," should double check the model then raise their concerns."
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"NASA policies recognize requirements for public safety. Those policies should be
reviewed and the models used should be continually updated and assessed with respect to
value in supporting timely decision making."
The detailed statement of Diaz Action #4 [ref. 1] was
"Develop a standard for the development, documentation, and operation of models and
simulations.
1. Identify best practices to ensure that knowledge of operations is captured in the
user interfaces (e.g., users are not able to enter parameters that are out of bounds).
2. Develop process for tool verification and validation, certification, re-verification,
revalidation, and recertification based on operational data and trending.
3. Develop standard for documentation, configuration management, and quality
assurance.
4. Identify any training or certification requirements to ensure proper operational
capabilities.
Provide a plan for tool management, maintenance, and obsolescence consistent
with modeling/simulation environments and the aging or changing of the modeled
platform or system.
Develop a process for user feedback when results appear unrealistic or defy
explanation."
6.3 NASA Chief Engineer Guidance
The specific goals stated for the M&S Standard in a memo by the NASA Chief Engineer dated
September 1, 2006 (see Appendix A), were that the M&S Standard will
• Ensure that the credibility of M&S results is properly conveyed to those making
critical decisions.
• Assure that the credibility of M&S meets the project requirements.
• Establish M&S requirements and recommendations that will forth a strong
foundation for disciplined (structure, management, control) development,
validation and use of M&S within NASA and its contractor community.
• Include a standard method to assess the credibility of the M&S presented to the
decision-maker when making critical decisions (i.e., decisions that effect human
safety or mission success) using results from M&S.
• Establish a common set of tenns and a unifonn way for M&S practitioners to
communicate the credibilit y of M&S.
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• Be responsive to Diaz Action #4."
The scope of the M&S Standard was based on guidance from the OCE. The general statement of
the scope provided in June 2005 was that the M&S Standard should apply to those M&S whose
results are used for decisions that may impact human safety or mission success. A companion
decision made by the OCE at that time was that the M&S Standard should not apply to software
used for control systems and displays. The scope was refined over the course of the
development, culminating in the specific language in the Permanent M&S Standard: "This
standard applies to M&S used by NASA and its contractors for critical decisions in design,
development, manufacturing, ground operations, and flight operations. This standard also applies
to use of legacy as well as commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), government-off-the-shelf (GOTS)
and modified-off-the-shelf (MOTS) M&S to support critical decisions.... This standard does not
apply to M&S that are embedded in control software, emulation software, and stimulation
environments." The key phrase "critical decisions" is explained thusly in the Permanent M&S
Standard: "Critical decisions based on M&S results, as defined by this standard, are those
technical decisions related to design, development, manufacturing, ground, or flight operations
that may impact human safety or program/project-defined mission success criteria."
Furthermore, the Permanent M&S Standard includes a risk assessment process for use by the
Program/Project and the technical authority in their determination of which M&S are in scope.
Requirements on the presentation is a rather unique approach for a standard, but gets to the heart
of the issues raised in the CAIB report [ref. 3], which emphasized that key information was not
properly conveyed to the decision-makers.
7.0 Major Activities
This section discusses the major activities by the Development Team, the Topic Working Group,
the Technical Standards Working Group, the OCE, and the EMB during the 3-year process of the
development, reviews, and revisions of the M&S Standard. The discussion is grouped by topic
rather than by the timeline.
The M&S Standard evolved through six distinct versions. The Development Team produced
Versions 1- 3 and the Topic Working Group was responsible for Versions 4 and 5. Version 6
consisted of the modifications to Version 5 that resulted from the EMB review (Section 7.6).
7.1 Timeline of M&S Standard Development
Table 7.1-1 summarizes the noteworthy activities during Phase 1 (see also Figure 5.0-1), and
Table 7.1-2 summarizes the noteworthy activities during Phase 2 (see also Figure 5.0-2). The
third column indicates the section(s) in which the activity is discussed.
NESC Request No.: 06-005-E
NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:
0 Technical Report RP-08-118 1.0
Title: Page #:
M&S Standard Completion 12 of 112
Table 7.1-1. M&S Standard Phase 1 Timeline
Date Activity Section
April 2005 OCE charters Development Team to respond to Diaz Action #4 1.0
April—June 2005 Development Team reviews existing NASA and non-NASA guidance
documents
7.2.1
June—July 2005 Space Shuttle Orbiter RCC RTF Impact Damage Threshold Assessment
Team pilot study
7.2.2
July 2005 Development Team completes uncertainty structure table 7.2.3
Aug.—Sept. 2005 Development Team writes Version 1 7.2.4
September 2005 Program Analysis & Evaluation Office recommends completion of Diaz
Action #4
7.2.1
September 2005 Development Team releases Version 1 to OCE and consultants 7.2.4
October 2005 Status review by OCE 7.2.1
Nov. 2005—April
2006
Development Team revises Version 1 7.2.4
Feb.—June 2006 M&S Standard Topic Working Group formed 7.2.4
March 2006 NASA Chief Engineer suggests inclusion of a Scale 7.2.3
April 2006 Development Team releases preliminary draft of Version 2 to
consultants
7.2.4
May 2006 Development Team releases Version 2 to Topic Working Group 7.2.4
May 2006 NASA / DoE /DoD meeting at DMSO (scales / maturity matrices) 7.2.3
May—July 2006 Briefings at ARC, GSFC, GRC, JPL, JSC, KSC, and MSFC 7.2.4
June 2006 Topic Working Group reviews Version 2 7.2.4
June 2006 NASA Chief Engineer targets the M&S Standard for release as a
NASA interim standard
7.2.3
July 2006 NASA Chief Engineer directs inclusion of a credibility assessment
scale in the M&S Standard
7.2.3
June—July 2006 Development Team revises Version 2 and adds first credibility
assessment scale
7.2.4
August 2006 Development Team releases Version 3 to Topic Working Group and
OCE as final team deliverable
7.2.4
NESC Request No.: 06-005-E
NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:0 Technical Report  RP-08-118 1.0
Title: Pale #:
M&S Standard Completion 13 of 112
Table 7.1-2. M&S Standard Phase 2 Timeline
Date Activity Section
August 2006 Topic Working Group meeting at HO 7.3.2
Aug.—Sept. 2006 Topic Working Group revises Version 3 7.3.2
September 2006 Topic Working Group meeting at JSC 7.3.2
October 2006 Topic Working Group approves Version 4 and releases to TSPO &
OCE
7.3.2
December 2006 OCE issues Interim M&S Standard 7.3.2
Feb.—March 2007 Topic Working Group rolls out Interim M&S Standard at Centers 7.3.3
March 2007 Scale Workshop 1 at LaRC 7.4.1
Mar.—June 2007 Centers conduct pilot studies 7.3.4
April 2007 Scale Workshop 2 at JSC 7.4.2
May 2007 Scale Workshop 3 at KSC 7.4.3
May—Aug. 2007 Agency-wide review of the Interim M&S Standard 7.5
July 2007 NASA / DoE workshop at Sandia National Laboratories 7.4.5
August 2007 Scale Workshop 4 at GSFC 7.4.4
Aug.—Nov. 2007 Topic Working Group disposition of formal comments 7.5.1
September 2007 Comment disposition meeting at JPL 7.5.1
November 2007 Topic Working Group approves Version 5 (Revised M&S Standard)
and releases to TSPO and OCE as final Topic Working Group
deliverable
7.5.1
Jan.—May 2008 Version 5 review by EMB/OCE 7.6
May 2008 Center objections discussed at EMB Meeting at MSFC 7.6
March—May 2008 Revision of Version 5 per EMB/OCE review 7.6
May 2008 Version 6 (Permanent M&S Standard) released to OCE 7.6
July 2008 OCE issues Permanent M&S Standard 7.6
7.2 Phase 1 Activities
7.2.1 Review of Existing M&S Guidance and Standards
During the May—July 2005 timeframe, the Development Team conducted an extensive search for
relevant M&S guidance and standards in NASA and other Federal Agencies. The initial search
identified by title approximately 300 documents that appeared relevant. These were
downselected to 100 based on a review of the document abstracts. These final 100 documents
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were each reviewed in depth by two members of the Development Team. The countless
publications by individuals or small groups on M&S guidance were not considered gennane for
assessing the state of consensus standards or guidance for M&S.
The following findings resulted from this review:
F-1. Current NASA guidance is oriented towards control systems and displays. Quality
assurance and configuration management are well covered, but the unique, critical
aspects of M&S are not addressed (i.e., validation against experimental or flight
data, and uncertainty quantification).
F-2. No Federal Agency has an M&S standard, although the DoD has extensive M&S
guidance, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has standards for control
systems and displays.
F-3. Relevant M&S guidance is strongly focused on the development phase of the M&S
life-cycle, and especially upon verification and validation. There is little guidance on
the operations of M&S and virtually no guidance on the maintenance of M&S.
The most relevant existing guidance on M&S includes the DoD's VV&A [Verification,
Validation and Accreditation] Recommended Practices Guide [ref. 6], the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics' (AIAA) Guide for Verification and Validation of Computational
Fluid Dynamics Simulation [ref. 7], the American Society of Mechanical Engineers' (ASME)
Guide for Verification and Validation in Computational Solid Mechanics [ref. 8], and Sandia
National Laboratories' Concepts for Stockpile Computing [ref. 9].
F-4. NASA has no policy or procedural requirements for M&S, except for the software
engineering aspects covered by NPD 2820.1B, NASA Software Policies, and NPR
71.50.2, NASA Software Engineering Requirements.
In July 2005, the report of the Space Shuttle RTF Group [ref. 2] was issued. Annex A.2
contained many remarks that reinforced the need for an M&S standard. Relevant excerpts are
provided in Appendix B of this report.
The Program Analysis and Evaluation Office reviewed all open Diaz Actions in September 2005.
The following information on Diaz Action #4 was provided from that review:
• "Applicability
o A general M&S standard would simplify the development of consistent,
discipline-specific standards by the Technical Warrant Holders
• Continuing Value
o Annex A.2 of the Stafford-Covey Return to Flight Task Group report [ref. 2]
emphasizes the need for a NASA M&S Standard
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• Related or Overlapping Activities
o NASA has existing or imminent NPDs, NPRs and standards that cover many of
the generic software engineering aspects of the Diaz #4 requirements (e.g.,
configuration management and quality assurance)
o However, the unique, critical aspects of Models and Simulations (M&S) are not
addressed by existing NASA or NASA-preferred documents, especially validation
against experimental or flight data & uncertainty quantification"
As a result of its review, the Program Analysis and Evaluation Office recommended that Diaz
Action #4 be completed.
In discussions with the OCE sponsor in August 2005, the Development Team recommended, and
the OCE concurred, that Diaz Action 44 should focus on the development of a Standard (as
opposed to an NPR or Guidebook), and that this standard should consist of explicit requirements
and recommendations.
In the October 24, 2005 meeting in which the FY 05 results were reported, the Development
Team recommended that the M&S Standard be anchored to a NPD or NPR. OCE indicated that
they favored covering the M&S Standard in a revision to NPR 7123. 1, Systems Engineering
Processes and Requirements.
At the meeting the OCE concurred with the Development Team recommendation that the M&S
Standard address "i hat" shall (requirement) or should (recommendation) be done. It would
address neither "Nvho" is responsible (an NPR-level issue), nor "hoiv" it should be done (a
Guideline-level issue). The domain of M&S is so broad that how requirements are implemented
will be application-specific.
7.2.2 Space Shuttle Orbiter RCC Impact Damage Threshold Assessment Team Pilot
Study
The initial plan submitted in April 2005 called for several pilot studies to be conducted. Due to
the time constraints only one pilot study was performed—with the LaRC and GRC members of
the Space Shuttle Orbiter RTF RCC Impact Damage Threshold Assessment Team. This team
was responsible for the NASA response to the RCC leading edge portion of the CAIB
Recommendation R3.8.2 (Section 6.1). An overview of this M&S project is given in ref. 10. This
was the single M&S activity most relevant to the CAIB recommendation that led to Diaz Action
#4.
This pilot was conducted in June–July 2005. The Development Team met face-to-face with the
team lead, Ed Fasanella of LaRC, and with other civil servant team members: Karen Lyle of
LaRC, and Matt Melis (GRC Team Lead), Kelly Carney, Robert Goldberg, Brad Lurch, Mike
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Pereira, and Duane Revilock of GRC. During these meetings, which took approximately 3 days,
the pilot team thoroughly explained the processes followed in conducting experiments,
developing material models, developing the full computational model (using LS-DYNA TM), and
undergoing technical reviews. These discussions influenced some of the choices in Version 1.
Members of this team provided detailed comments on Versions 1 and 2. The LaRC team
members also provided feedback on the two scales in the Interim M&S Standard based on
application of both to their M&S project.
7.2.3 M&S Scales/Maturity Matrices
The first indication that OCE was interested in having what has come to be called the "credibility
assessment scale" came during a meeting between the team lead and the NASA Chief Engineer
on March 1, 2006. The Chief Engineer stated that he wanted a level of rigor scale in the M&S
Standard and not in any supporting document such as an M&S Guidebook. At this meeting the
only scale that the team lead had at hand was the Uncertainty Structure [ref. 11]. The Chief
Engineer indicated that something along the lines of this matrix was what he had envisioned,
albeit one covering all aspects of M&S and not just uncertainty.
The Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) hosted a small workshop on M&S
maturity matrices on May 9-10, 2006, at which the Validation Process Maturity Model (VPMM)
[ref. 12], the Predictive Capability Maturity Model (PCMM) [ref. 13], the Uncertainty Structure
scale [ref. 11], and the Simulation Readiness Level (SRL) scale [ref. 14] were presented and
critiqued. Each of these scales had been developed by a small, homogeneous group that consisted
of individuals from at most 2 branches at a single laboratory (in NASA terms). Each scale had
evolved over a period of 2-4 years and each was still evolving. All agreed that there had been
arguments even among their small group on the factors and level definitions for their scale. All
agreed that application of the scales to a broad spectrum of actual M&S activities was essential
to development of a useful scale.
The Development Team reached the following conclusions:
F-5. There does not presently exist an M&S scale with the specific objectives desired for
the M&S Standard.
0-1. Development of a rigor scale is extremely difficult, even for a small, homogeneous
group, and even restricted to M&S using mathematical models based on partial
differential equations (PDEs).
A second meeting was held with the NASA Chief Engineer on July 19, 2006. The Development
Team proposed the use of an "adherence scale" (i.e., how well were the M&S Standard
requirements satisfied in lieu of a "rigor scale") because of the difficulty in devising an
acceptable rigor scale that is applicable to all types of M&S. The NASA Chief Engineer directed
the Development Team to produce a rigor scale (called the credibility assessment scale in the
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Permanent M&S Standard), even if is very high level and even if it had to be restricted to just
PDE-based M&S. At this same meeting the NASA Chief Engineer also indicated that since he
had detennined that the M&S Standard should be issued as a NASA interim standard (see
Sections 5.0 and 7.3.1), he desired that Version 3 be completed by mid-August 2006.
As a result of this guidance, over the following three weeks the Development Team devised the
rigor scale that appeared in Appendix A2 of Version 3 (and ultimately in the Interim M&S
Standard). The detailed rationale behind this scale is available in Reference 15. The context of
this scale was that the credibility of the results is determined by the decision-maker based upon
two pieces of information:
1. The estimate of the uncertainty in the results (Req. 4.8.3 of the Interim M&S Standard)
2. The objective assessment of the rigor of the processes used to generate the results
(including the uncertainty estimate) (Req. 4.8.5 of the Interim M&S Standard)
The Development Team's perspective was that
0-2. The credibility scale is not a stand-alone assessment of factors influencing
credibility, but rather the credibility assessment scale plus the uncertainty statement
combine to influence the credibility assessment by the decision -maker.
Subsequently, the MSFC member of the Topic Working Group proposed an alternative
credibility assessment scale that appeared in Appendix A3 of the Interim M&S Standard. See
reference 16 for details on this scale.
7.2.4 First Three Versions of the Standard
The Development Team produced three versions of the M&S Standard. This section discusses
the major characteristics of those versions and the results of the reviews that were performed.
The Topic Working Group produced an additional two versions in Phase 2. Those are covered in
Sections 7.3.2 and 7.5. The final version, which contains changes made as a result of the EMB
review, is discussed in Section 7.6.
Version 1
Version 1 was the straw man intended to: (1) satisfy the OCE need for a specific deliverable at
the end of FY 05, and (2) provoke comments from reviewers to assist the Development Team in
sharpening their thinking on the goal, objectives, and structure of the M&S Standard.
At this point (September 2005) in the development process the vision of the Development Team
was that
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The M&S Standard should require the NASA M&S development and operations
communities to report their processes in such a manner that the decision-maker can
quantitatively assess the associated risk for safety and mission assurance.
2. This standard should be supplemented by a recommended practices guide that enables the
above.
The M&S Standard should be such that working troops and project managers can
understand and accept its processes.
The objectives for this standard were "to make available standard practices for assuring and
quantitatively assessing the quality M&S results throughout their development and use for
specific applications, together with timely and complete reporting of the quality assurance
processes and assessments."
The key aspects were:
• Documentation and reporting, etc.
• Defensible confidence building
• Defensible uncertainty quantification
Version 1 of the M&S Standard, entitled "Quality Assurance for Models and Simulations", was
circulated on September 21, 2005. Comments were submitted by Osman Balci, Robert Gravitz,
Sankharan Mahadevan, Audrey Milroy, David Peercy, William Oberkampf, David O'Neil, and
David Schuster. The comments led to a complete re-thinking of the M&S Standard during Fall
2005.
This is the version that was discussed at the status update to the OCE on October 24, 2005 of the
FY 05 accomplishments.
Version 2
Two of the major objections to Version 1 were its emphasis on quality, and the large number of
requirements. The Development Team concluded that couching the M&S Standard in terms of
quality would impede the acceptance of the M&S Standard by practitioners. In addition to this
philosophical change, the principles articulated in November 2005 that guided the development
of Version 2 were
1. Keep it simple and concise.
2. Stick to the essence.
3. The prize goes to the shortest, clearest document.
4. Don't have a requirement that will frequently be waived.
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Ideally, future debates about revisions to the M&S Standard should be about putting
additional requirements or recommendations into the M&S Standard, and not about
taking existing requirements or recommendations out of the M&S Standard.
The ground rule that the Development Team adopted for the inclusion of a requirement in the
M&S Standard was that the team had to agree unanimously on its inclusion. This rule helped to
enforce the principles listed above.
As Version 2 matured, the specific objectives of that standard were articulated as "The
requirements and recommendations of the M&S Standard are intended to assure that
• Decision-makers can assess the credibility of results from M&S.
• Violations of the limitations of the M&S are apparent to decision-makers, and a summary
of the limitations are easily accessible to the decision-maker.
• Processes for modeling and simulation are transparent to decision—makers.
• Rigor of the M&S can be evaluated against the program or project requirements.
• Results from the M&S are reproducible by M&S domain experts".
The Development Team's experiences in devising the first two versions of the M&S Standard
are summarized as
0-3. Frequent face-to-face meetings were essential for the initial formulation of the M&S
Standard.
A preliminary draft of the second version of the M&S Standard was circulated on March 31,
2006. Their comments led to a significant refinement of the final Version 2 and, in particular, to
the articulation of two high-level goals:
"The primary goal of this standard is to ensure that the credibility of the results
from models and simulations is properly conveyed to those making critical
decisions based in full or in part upon the results of models and simulations.
2. The secondary goal is to increase that credibility."
This version did not include a credibility assessment scale.
The Topic Working Group for the M&S Standard was constituted during February—June 2006.
The Kick-Off Meeting for the Topic Working Group review of Version 3 of the M&S Standard
occurred on May 23, 2006 at GRC. At this point, 8 of the 10 Centers were involved. JPL joined
the Topic Working Group in June 2006, and DFRC chose not to participate. Centers present in
person at the Kick-Off Meeting were ARC, GRC, and MSFC. JSC, GSFC, KSC, LaRC, and
SSC participated via teleconference. The Topic Working Group was briefed on the background
on the M&S Standard, on its overall philosophy, the top-level decisions, a survey of the
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requirements, and the process for providing feedback. Subsequently, visits were made to KSC
(May 31), JPL (June 13), ARC (June 14), JSC (June 15), GSFC (June 26), and MSFC (July 14)
to brief the Topic Working Group representative and/or others at the Center, and to solicit
feedback.
During the discussions with the Orbiter RCC Impact Damage Threshold Assessment Team and
these meetings at the various Centers, the Development Team observed that
0-4. Many engineers and program managers at NASA are unaware of the intended
hierarchy of the agency guidance documents.
0-5. Many engineers at NASA are unaware of standards that are relevant to their work.
Approximately 306 comments were submitted on Version 2 as a result of this first Topic
Working Group review. Of these, approximately t^vo-thirds came from Topic Working Group
members.
Version 3
Version 3 had numerous detailed changes made as a result of these comments. Approximately
half of the comments were accepted. Many of the rejected comments were objections to having a
standard at all or to specific choices, such as scope, for which guidance had been provided by
OCE. In addition, Version 3 included a credibility assessment scale in response to the NASA
Chief Engineer's July 19, 2006 direction (Section 7.2.3).
Version 3 was submitted to the OCE and the Topic Working Group on August 15, 2006. This
marked the final deliverable of the Development Team and the conclusion of Phase 1.
At this point, the Topic Working Group became the responsible body. They revised Version 3,
formally approved the resulting Version 4 on September 28, and submitted it to OCE (Section
7.3.2).
7.3 The Interim M&S Standard
7.3.1 Background on Interim M&S Standards
In mid-2006 the OCE determined that there were some standards needed by Programs and
Projects that could not wait for the lengthy review process required of NASA permanent
standards. A NASA Interim Directive on Interim NASA Technical Standards was formally
issued on August 24, 2006. The role of the Topic Working Group was stated as follows:
"The Chair of the Topic Working Group shall prepare
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a. A consensus version of the candidate document which bears a NASA-STD-(I)-
xxxx designation and the following footnote on the cover and each page: "This
document represents the technical consensus of the developing group but does not
yet have final NASA approval. "
b. Certification that Center representatives participating in the Topic Working Group
have reached consensus on all substantive technical issues."
The Technical Standards Executive (Richard Weinstein) explained that the term "consensus"
meant "absence of a sustained, substantive technical objection."
7.3.2 Version 3 Review
The review and revisions to Version 3 were performed by the Topic Working Group in August
and September 2006. The process for interim standards required that all 300 of the comments on
version 2 be formally dispositioned. The Topic Working Group reviewed the disposition by the
Development Team of the comments on Version 2, and reviewed the new material in Section 4.7
and Appendix A of the standard on the credibility assessment scale. (Note: Although Version 3,
Version 4 and the Interim M&S Standard used the term "credibility scale" and not the term
"credibility assessment scale" that is used in Version 5 and the Permanent M&S Standard, the
latter term is used in this document for consistency.)
The rules for disposition of individual comments were that in order to disposition a comment (a)
the Topic Working Group representative from the commenter's Center needed to be present, and
(b) a supermajority of these present was needed to a decision on the comment. The Topic
Working Group held two meetings (with some members connected via teleconference) as part of
their review of Version 3. The first was held August 30-31 at NASA Headquarters (HQ). The
second was held September 5-6 at JSC. As a result of this process, a number of the proposed
dispositions were changed by the Topic Working Group.
At the end of the meeting at NASA HQ, the NASA Chief Engineer met with the Topic Working
Group to discuss his goals for the credibility assessment scale. Two detailed alternatives to the
credibility assessment scale in Version 3 were offered by Topic Working Group members, one
by Joe Hale (MSFC) and one by Unmeel Mehta (ARC). A major outcome of the JSC meeting
was the decision (by a 6-3 vote) to use a multi-dimensional rather than a one-dimensional scale.
This left the credibility assessment scale in Version 3 and the Hale alternative as options. The
Topic Working Group was unable, in the time available to produce the Interim M&S Standard,
to come to supermajority agreement on a single credibility assessment scale. Therefore, the
Interim M&S Standard contained two alternatives located in Appendices A2 and A3, referred to
hereafter as the A2 scale and the A3 scale, respectively.
NESC Request No.: 06-005-E
NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:0 Technical Report  RP-08-118 1.0
Title: Pale #:
M&S Standard Completion 22 of 112
The Topic Working Group wrestled considerably with the definition of consensus given in the
NASA Interim Directive on Interim NASA Technical Standards, and concluded that
F-6. The definition of a Topic Working Group consensus in the NASA Interim Directive
on Interim NASA Technical Standards is not sufficiently precise.
At the end of this process, Version 4 was voted upon by the Topic Working Group. Three
options were available: (a) concur; (b) can live with it (but have some reservations); or (c) non-
concur. The results of the vote are recorded in Table 7.3-1. Version 4 was submitted to the
NASA Technical Standards Program Office on October 10, 2006.
Table 7.3-3. Topic Working Group Vote on the Interim M&S Standard
Center Representative Vote
ARC Unmeel Mehta Non-concur
GRC Jeffrey Rusick Can live with it
GSFC Thomas McCarthy Concur
JPL Jeffrey Estefan Can live with it
JSC Galen Overstreet Can live with it
KSC Martin Steele Can live with it
LaRC Richard Davis Concur
MSFC Joe Hale Can live with it
SSC Jody Woods Concur
The objections of the ARC representative are provided in Appendix C. As a result of discussions
with OCE, the ARC EMB member did not sustain this objection on the assurance that the ARC
concerns would be addressed in the path forward towards a permanent standard. Version 4 was
adopted as the Interim M&S Standard after OCE changed the specific term "certification" to the
generic term "endorsement" in one requirement and several level definitions in the two scales.
The NASA Chief Engineer issued the Interim NASA Standard for M&S, NASA-STD-(I)-7009
[ref. 4], on December 1, 2006.
The issuance of the Interim M&S Standard completed the work of the initial Topic Working
Group. Afterwards the Topic Working Group members from GRC, GSFC, JPL, and JSC were
replaced due to other commitments. The LaRC Topic Working Group member was replaced
upon his retirement in March 2007.
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7.3.3 Rollout of the Interim M&S Standard
The OCE gave the Topic Working Group members the responsibility for rolling out the Interim
M&S Standard at their Centers. The Topic Working Group developed several briefings for this
purpose.
M&S Standard Executive Briefing: This briefing was given to the Center EMB members
during February—March 2007. The purpose was to acquaint them with the motivation, scope,
development process, key requirements and the credibility assessment scale. Furthermore, their
support was solicited in the following areas:
• Ensure that your Center is represented on the Topic Working Group by a knowledgeable
individual who can devote 10-15 percent of his/her time to the various Topic Working
Group tasks
• Support the roll-out of Interim M&S Standard at your Center
• Sponsor pilot studies of Interim M&S Standard
• Encourage broad input into the Topic Working Group process from your Center on the
Interim M&S Standard
M&S Standard Practitioner Briefing: This briefing was typically given at branch meetings and
M&S team meetings during February—April 2007. It contained more details on the motivation,
scope, development process, key requirements, and the credibility assessment scale than the
Executive Briefing. It also gave an overview of the objectives and format of the pilot studies
(Section 7.3.4).
7.3.4 Pilot Studies on the Interim M&S Standard
During the first half of 2007, pilot studies using the Interim M&S Standard were conducted by
M&S teams at most Centers. These are listed in Table 7.3-2. Their purpose was to provide
feedback to the Topic Working Group on practical experience with the Interim M&S Standard
and to ensure that the Center comments during the subsequent formal review were informed by
this practical experience. Collectively, these pilot studies included a reasonably broad spectrum
of M&S types (mostly using mathematical models based on differential equations, but also
including a discrete model and a geometry model) and applications.
Table 7.3-4. Pilot Studies Using the Interim M&S Standard
Center Application Discipline(s)
ARC Aerodynamic database supporting a Crew Aerodynamics
Exploration Vehicle-like atmospheric re-entry
capsule
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GSFC Model of a Fine Guidance Sensor for the James Guidance,
Webb Space Telescope Navigation, and
Control (GN&C)
JPL Thennal model of Mars Exploration Rover Cruise Thermal
Stage
JPL Mars Exploration Rover Entry, Descent, and Many
Landing Simulation
JPL Simulation of the Kepler telescope, emphasizing Science
detection of planet transients around the host star
JPL Model of an oceanographic sensor Science
KSC Extend @TM -based discrete event simulation to Logistics
assess readiness and launch availability for the
Crew Launch Vehicle
KSC Matlab@TM -based discrete event simulation for Logistics
interplanetary logistics in building up and
sustaining a lunar outpost
LaRC Uncertainty analysis of historical hurricane data, in Uncertainty
support of hurricane predictions
MSFC Crew Launch Vehicle system readiness and launch Processing,
availability maintenance
SSC Computational Fluid Dynamics Methane Aerodynamics,
Technology Testbed model of a rocket thruster Combustion
The Topic Working Group had developed a briefing for the pilot teams to supplement the M&S
Standard Practitioners Briefing. The guidance provided to the pilot teams in this briefing
consisted of:
"Pilot Study (PS) Purpose
• Determine whether the implementation of NASA-STD-(I)-7009 can fiilfill the stated
goals (see slide #9)
• Collect practical M&S experience with the Credibility Scales from developers, analysts
& decision-makers
• Determine if the resulting M&S product would be better from using the Standard
• Assess the cost-benefit tradeoff
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o the cost of implementing the M&S Standard
o any benefit from the M&S Standard versus its cost
Pilot Studies: Ideal Characteristics
• The ensemble of Pilot Studies from all Centers should cover the frill spectrum of types of
M&S (e.g., PDE-based, discrete-event-simulation based, cost models, operations models,
design models, fault-tree models)
• Pilot Studies should include and focus on M&S activities that were sufficiently mature
that results were presented to decision makers
• Each Pilot Study should be manageable (addressable within 2 months)
Pilot Study Team Responsibilities
• Apply the M&S Standard to the M&S in your Pilot Study
• Assess how well the M&S Standard fulfills stated goals of M&S Standard
• Evaluate the credibility scale, using both methods in Appendix A
• Early input on scale needed by 4/12
• Assess benefit from applying the M&S Standard to your M&S
• Assess additional cost imposed by applying the M&S Standard to your M&S
• Submit a report of the pilot results to the Topic Working Group
• Work with your TSWG representative to incorporate your comments into the NASA-
wide formal review of the M&S Standard
Pilot Study Report Outline
• Pilot Study Background
• Briefly describe the M&S Project
• Identify any Requirements not covered and why
• Response to Credibility Scale Questionnaire
• Overall Comments/Concerns
• Ease of Use (Std. & Scale)
• Achievement of Goals of Standard
• Cost-Benefit
• Mock Briefing to Decision-maker (desirable)
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• Optional (these comments can be made during Formal Review)
o Clarity/Understandability of the Document
o Response to Individual Requirement Questionnaire"
Two types of questionnaires were submitted to the pilot teams. One focused on the credibility
assessment scales that were in the Interim M&S Standard, and the other covered the M&S
Standard as a whole. A second similar questionnaire inquired how well the goals of the Interim
M&S Standard are satisfied and what is the cost impact of compliance with the M&S Standard.
The pilot studies began on February 1. The scale questionnaire was submitted by April 20 and
reviewed during the Second Scale Workshop (Section 7.6.2), and the final reports, whose major
component was the responses to the second questionnaire, were submitted by the end of June.
The final reports were due in the middle of the formal NASA-wide review. Hence, the pilot
teams had a strong basis of experience with the Interim M&S Standard on which to base their
formal comments.
Both questionnaires are discussed in more detail in Section 11, along with a summary of the
responses to the multiple-choice questions. Section 11 also contains a data summary collected on
the estimate of the cost impact of the M&S Standard.
These pilot studies were based on the Interim M&S Standard and their relevance to the Revised
M&S Standard is limited.
7.4 Phase 2 Scale Workshops
The Topic Working Group noted that
0-6. The credibility assessment scale is outside the formal Diaz Action #4.
Developing an appropriate single scale for the M&S Standard was a major issue that the Topic
Working Group worked to resolve during Phase 2. Indeed, this activity absorbed most of the
Topic Working Group effort from March through July 2007. Much of the work on the scale was
done at four face-to-face workshops, each lasting a day-and-a-half. A trained facilitator (Charles
Dunton from LaRC) supported the first three workshops.
Detailed notes from these workshops are available on the team website. The most important
considerations are summarized in the following sections.
A high-level summary of the process used in developing the final Scale is provided in Figure
7.4-3. It started from a search of the literature, was influenced by Topic Working Group
interviews of decision-makers, continued with the distillation of (orthogonal) factors, moved to
selecting the final subset of key factors, and closed with determining the mechanism for
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reporting the results of the assessment. More details of these steps are provided in the remainder
of this subsection.
Figure 7.4-3. M&S Credibility Assessment Scale Development
7.4.1 Scale Workshop 1
The Scale Workshop 1 was held at LaRC on March 6 and 7. This was the only scale workshop
with non-Topic Working Group members (aside from the facilitator) in attendance. The
objectives were
1. Topic Working Group members understand the experiences (good, bad, and ugly) of
other groups with M&S scales.
2. Topic Working Group refines the plans for the pilot to ensure optimal feedback on the
scales.
Topic Working Group develops a plan to revise the scales.
All Topic Working Group members attended (except for Maria Babula and Kenneth Johnson,
who joined the Topic Working Group later). Non-Topic Working Group members in attendance
were Hal Bell (OCE), Steve Blattmg (LaRC), Charles Dunton (LaRC facilitator), Lawrence
Green (LaRC), Scott Harmon (Zetetek & DMSO), Hans Mair (DoD), William Oberkampf
(Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque), and Simone Youngblood (DMSO)
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The first morning was devoted to presentations and discussions of various scales:
1. CFD Simulation Readiness Level (Kevin Tucker, MSFC) [ref. 14].
2. Predictive Capability Maturity Model (William Oberkampf, Sandia National
Laboratories, Albuquerque) [ref. 13].
3. Validation Process Maturity Model (Scott Harmon, Zetetek) [ref. 12].
4. A2 scale (Steve Blattnig, LaRC) [ref 15].
5. A3 scale (Joe Hale, MSFC) [ref. 16].
A brainstorming session was held in the afternoon on identifying ideal characteristics of an M&S
Scale. The next morning, the Topic Working Group identified the following information needed
from the pilots in order to inform our decisions on revising the M&S Standard:
1. Need perspectives of both practitioners and decision-makers.
2. Is the M&S Standard being interpreted uniformly?
3. How well does the scale work for single M&S versus coupled M&S?
4. How much work and cost is this going to add?
5. How is credibility understood?
6. Can the M&S Standard be used to brief M&S work to management`?
A plan for completing the scale was developed, with a target completion date of May 31.
The Topic Working Group fonned three subteams to work specific issues raised at this
workshop:
• Pilot Questionnaire: Zang
• M&S Credibility Literature: Mehta, Hale, Sylvester
• Information Quality Literature: Davis, Bertch, Mosier
These teams' products were developed and discussed during subsequent weekly Topic Working
Group teleconferences.
The M&S Credibility Literature Subteam recommended the following papers be read by the fiill
Topic Working Group: Mehta [ref. 17], Fogg & Tseng [ref. 18], Tseng & Fogg [ref. 19], and
Balci [ref. 20]. The Information Quality Literature subteam did not recommend any papers to be
read by the full Topic Working Group. However, the Wang & Strong [ref. 21] paper had been
strongly recommended by both Scott Ham-ion and William Oberkampf at the workshop.
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This first workshop and the off-line work and weekly meetings over the following month or so
constituted the literature review phase.
This first workshop led the Topic Working Group to conclude the following Finding:
F-7. There is a substantial literature on M&S credibility and/or scales, several other
attempts, and numerous "lessons learned" on this subject.
7.4.2 Scale Workshop 2
The Scale Workshop 2 was held at JSC on April 24 and 25. The objectives were
1. Review the results of the Pilot Scale Questionnaire (Section 11.2).
2. Review the draft Pilot Questionnaire.
3. Make the major decisions on the credibility assessment scale, namely
a. What is the goal of the credibility assessment scale in the M&S Standard?
b. What would a candidate Concept of Operations (Use Case) be for the use of a
credibility scale?
c. What are we trying to measure with the credibility assessment scale?
d. What are the key steps associated with M&S development that can be used for
assessing credibility`?
e. What key features/attributes of M&S can be used to assess credibility?
f. What model/architecture provides an efficient method for a credibility scale?
All Topic Working Group members attended (except for Kenneth Johnson).
The workshop contained two brainstonning sessions: one on possible architectures for the
credibility assessment scale, and another on potential factors in the credibility assessment scale.
(The Topic Working Group used the terms "architecture" and "model" interchangeably.) The
results for the architecture brainstorming sessions are captured in Fi gure 7.4-4. The focus of the
discussion was whether the factors in the credibility assessment scale are considered as a set of
serial (or sequential) products or processes, or whether the factors represent products produced or
processes conducted in parallel. The implication of the serial model is that no factor is evaluated
(or scored) unless all factors that precede it are evaluated at an acceptable level. With the parallel
architecture, however, each factor is scored independently of the other factors. (The Permanent
M&S Standard [ref. 5] uses the parallel architecture; an example of a scale with a serial
architecture is given in ref. 22.)
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Figure 7.4-5. Brainstorming on the Key Factors for Assessing Credibility
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Principal decisions that -were made (by supermajority vote) were
1. The M&S Standard and the credibility assessment scale must cover all types of M&S.
2. The Topic Work Group should include some processes along with products as potential
factors in the credibility assessment scale.
Fi,- ire7.4-5  illustrates the results of the brainstorming on key factors for assessing credibility.
The list of candidate factors was over a hundred. The follow, -up action was for the Topic
Working Group to compile an organized list of all the candidate factors, with a crisp definition
for each factor. This list ended up with 98 candidate factors.
Leading up to the subsequent workshop, the two important off-line activities for the Topic
Working Group members were (1) to conduct and assess the implication of the interviews of
decision makers, and (2) to rate the relevance of the candidate factors to assessing the credibility
of the M&S results. The ratings for (2) were performed on the following scale:
1. Keep it (gotta have)
2. I'm on the fence (nice to have)
3. Get rid of it (not needed)
7.4.3 Scale Workshop 3
The Scale Workshop 3 was held at KSC on May 22 and 23. The objectives were:
1. Credibility Factors are identified at the 90-100 percent level.
2. The Hierarchy is identified at the 90 percent level.
3. Progress has been made on Level Definitions for the Credibility Factors.
4. Progress has been made on the roll-up algorithm for evaluation.
All Topic Working Group members attended l . Much of the first day was occupied with
reviewing the results of the decision-maker interviews (Section 11.3) and the candidate factor
ratings. The full list of factors that were rated on the 1-3 scale and described at the end of
Section 7.4.2 is given in Fi gure7.4-6. These factors were grouped into the 11 general areas
highlighted in yellow in the lower right part of the figure. The factors highlighted in green were
those that rated the highest, and those highlighted in orange were the "near misses." Subsequent
discussions concentrated on these 16 most highly rated factors. There followed some
consolidation and refinement of the definitions of the factors. By the end of the workshop the
Jody Woods was present for only a few hours due to travel complications.
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Topic Working Group succeeded in down-selecting the list to the 9 factors judged to be the most
important. These were grouped into 3 categories.
The second objective focused on the details of the parallel architecture that had been decided at
Workshop 2.
I	 Robustness
1	 Sensitivity Analysis
1	 Mu-,in (Marvin Sensitivity)
4	 Configuration Management
4 1 Software Configuration Management
6	 Technical Review
7	 Accuracy
7	 Uncertainty
7	 Assertion Completeness
4 lRequirenients Definition
1 Risk 4 Project Management
1 M&S Validity Under Load 4 Engineering 7 JAccurateness of Model Response
1 Bouuudary Conditions 4 Support 7 IType A Evaluation of Uncertainty Usin g Statistical
I Sensitivities 4 Process Management 7 IType B Evaluation Using Non-statistical Methods
I Design of Experiments 4 Input Data (Data Management) 8	 Input Validation
8	 Initial ConditionsFidelity 4 Execution Configuration (Config
2	 Functionality
2	 M&S Verification (M&S V&V)
2	 Adequacy of Representation
4 Output Data (Data Management) 8 1hiprit Data Accuracy
4 lHas Model Been Maintained 9	 People Qualifications
9	 JGeneral Experience4 1hifrastiucture Set-Up
2 Consistency of Representation 5	 Requirements Stability
5	 Reliability
9 Education
2 Completeness of Representation 9 Experience on the Specific M&S
2 M&S Causality 5 lRerisability 9 Training for the Specific M&S
2 Interface Definition 5 Testability 10 Use Validation
Interface Functionality 5 Traceability 10	 Range of Validity
10	 Maturity
2 Type of M&S 5 Usability
2 Software Control Flow 5 Remission of Coding Errors
2 Data Variables Interdependency 5 Adherence to Coding Standards 10 IScale S Size of M&S
2 Input/Output Transformation Response 5 Adequacy of Execution Behavior I 1
11
11
IRepeatability
Reproducibility
M&S Repeatability
2
2
Software Interface Structure
Units of Measure
5 Adequacy of Behavior During Fault/Failure
5 JUsability S User Interface
ISupportability I 1 Data Reduction
2 Standard Models Selection 5 Flexibility 11 JAnonialy Resolution
2 Software Semantics 5 Maintainability I1	 JData. Analysis
_	 Sofhx are Synnbolic Accuracy 5 Extensibility I	 Sensitivity
2	 Verification
3	 Validation
4	 Project Management
5	 Process
6	 Teclurical Review
,	 Accuracy
8	 Input Validation
9	 Operator Qualification
10 M&S Use
I1	 Analysis
2	 Software Syntax 5 Portability
3	 M&S Validation (M&S V&V)
3 Output Validations
3	 (Predictive Capability
3	 Validity with Respect to Real-World Data
3	 Validity vith Respect to Other M& S
5 Modularity
5 Specialty Engineering
5 Operator Error Resolution
5 1 Software Error Resolution
5 lHardware Error Resolution
Predictive Validity ; Data Mana gement
3 Validity ofM&S Subsystems (Shuctrual 5 Complexity
5 Report Generation
Figure 7.4-6. Initial Evaluation of Potential Credibility Assessment Scale Factors
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The specific hierarchical architecture that was selected for the credibility assessment scale had 3
tiers:
1. Summary (top, or single, tier)
2. Categories (middle, or second, tier)
3. Factors (bottom, or third, tier)
The second tier—the categories—consisted of
1. M&S Development
2. M&S Operations
3. Supporting Evidence
(The category names identified here are those in the Revised M&S Standard. The preliminary
names chosen at the Third Scale Workshop changed in the ensuing months, but their scope did
not.)
The third tier—the factors—consisted of
1. Verification
2. Validation
3. Input Validation
4. Uncertainty Quantification
5. Sensitivity Analysis
6. Use History
7. Configuration Management
8. People Qualifications
9. Technical Review
After months of further discussion, the factors in the final credibility assessment scale that
appears in the Permanent M&S Standard (compare with Figure 8.0-1) were remarkably similar to
the preliminary version that emerged from the Scale Workshop 3. The major difference was that
one of the factors—Technical Review—was later moved to a new, fourth tier, as a subfactor that
influenced the assessments of the first 5 of the 8 remaining factors. A minor difference is that
M&S Management was a narrower factor in the "KSC Scale". There were also some name
changes made subsequently, and Use History was moved from the M&S Development category
to the Supporting Evidence category.
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The issues of whether and, if so, how to roll up the results was left for subsequent discussion.
The main follow-up action was to provide level definitions for the factors. This was an important
step because it would reveal whether or not a factor could actually be assessed objectively.
The results from the pilot studies—both the Pilot Questionnaires (Section 11.4) and the Pilot
Reports (Section 7.3.4)—were reviewed during July.
7.4.4 Scale Workshop 4
The Scale Workshop 4 was held at GSFC on August 8 and 9. The objectives were
1. Finalize the credibility assessment scale to be used in the M&S Standard
• Goal
• Structure
• Categories/factors/subfactors (Tiers 2-4)
• Roll-up
• Level Definitions
2. Complete substantial drafts of Sects 4.7 and Appendix A in the M&S Standard.
Most Topic Working Group members attended; Jody Woods and Kenneth Johnson were absent.
Objective #1 was only partially completed, and Objective #2 was not addressed as Objective #1
needed to be completed first.
The goals identified for the credibility assessment scale were
• To define a common language by which credibility can be assessed,
• To inform decision-makers about the credibility of the current M&S results using the
common language,
Underlying assumptions that were agreed upon were
• Credibility cannot be measured directly,
• Credibility assessment is accomplished by reviewing factors,
• The credibility assessment scale measures key factors that contribute to credibility,
• The factors are orthogonal, or nearly so,
• For factors that correspond to processes, the credibility assessment is based upon the
quality of the process outputs,
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The decision was made at this workshop to alter the structure of the credibility assessment scale
by adding subfactors, but this was only for the purpose of moving Technical Review to a
subfactor position for the first five factors.
Other major decisions made at this workshop were:
• Roll-up to a single number, but require it be accompanied by lower Tier information.
• Ignore Categories in any reporting.
• Do not require reporting of subfactors as a primary report, although they will necessarily
be in backup.
• Use weighting in roll-up.
• Program defines weights, and M&S Standard Section 4.1 requires that the Program
documents weights with rationale.
Some progress was made on the level definitions at the Scale Workshop 4. However, as the level
definitions were refined, there were discussions about the distinctions between some of the
factors. These discussions continued (as a secondary priority) into October, leading to significant
changes in the focus of the factors. As the Topic Working Group learned, writing good level
definitions is probably harder and more time-consuming than picking the factors themselves.
After this workshop, the top priority of the Topic Working Group was resolution of the
comments from the formal Agency-wide review (Section 7.5).
7.4.5 Sandia National Laboratories-NASA Workshop
In between Scale Workshops 3 and 4, a 1-day meeting was held in Albuquerque, NM between
several members of the Topic Working Group (Gary Mosier, Martin Steele, Andre Sylvester,
Thomas Zang (via telephone)), Hal Bell of OCE, three individuals from Sandia National
Laboratories (David Peercy, Martin Pilch, William Oberkampf), and one person from Los
Alamos National Laboratory (Franyois Hemez). The purpose of the meeting was to compare
experiences with scales. Sandia National Laboratories personnel applied the draft of the NASA
credibility assessment scale to one of their applications (a legacy weapon exposed to a fire
during an incident). The Topic Working Group discussed two applications of the PCMM to
NASA M&S—the Orbiter RCC Impact Damage Threshold Assessment application (Section
7.2.2) and an integrated thermal-structural model for the James Webb Space Telescope. The
Topic Working Group also gave Sandia National Laboratories personnel electronic copies of five
other assessments of the PCMM to NASA applications, but there was only time at the meeting
for discussion of the two mentioned above. The main conclusion that all attendees drew from the
meeting was that clear terminology in the factor definitions and the level definitions was
essential, and that this is a very difficult task. There were numerous specific comments and
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questions from Sandia National Laboratories personnel on the details of the credibility
assessment scale.
7.5 Formal Agency-wide Review
7.5.1 Interim M&S Standard Review
The formal NASA review of the Interim M&S Standard opened on May 11, 2007 and comments
were due July 17, 2007. However, comments from several Centers were not received until the
latter half of August 2007. A total of 377 comments were received in the form of a Comment
Resolution Matrix.
The Topic Working Group's activities from mid-August through mid-November 2008 focused
on the disposition of these comments. Most of this work was done via WebEx sessions. There
was a face-to-face meeting at JPL on September 5-6, 2007. There also was a two-day
teleconference on October 10-11, 2007.
Although the focus during this period was on the disposition of the formal comments, work
continued on refinement of the level definitions in the credibility assessment scale.
The Topic Working Group either concurred (made exact change requested) or partially
concurred (made a change similar to that requested) on 251 comments. The Topic Working
Group concurred on 88 comments, and 37 comments did not request a substantive change (e.g.,
addressed style issues).
Comments were divided in major and minor comments. Subteams developed disposition
recommendations for minor comments. The Topic Working Group reviewed these off-line, and
these recommendations were adopted without discussion unless a Topic Working Group member
objected to the recommendation. All major comments were discussed by the Topic Working
Group. A supermajority was required in order to decide on the disposition of a comment. This
entailed rather lengthy deliberations at times in order to reach a decision.
The disposition of each comment, along with the rationale for those comments with which the
Topic Working Group did not concur, was recorded in the Comment Resolution Matrix. Each
decision was conveyed to the commenter by the Topic Working Group member from the
commenter's Center. Commenters objecting to the disposition of their comment(s) needed to
persuade their Engineering Director to sustain their objection for this to be brought to the EMB
for resolution.
Table 7.5-1 records the votes of the Topic Working Group members on the Revised M&S
Standard (Version 5). Because the credibility assessment scale was more controversial than the
rest of the document, the vote was broken into two parts: (1) the scale and its related
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requirements, and (2) all the rest of the M&S Standard. Three options were available (a)
approve; (b) can live with it (but have some reservations); or (c) disapprove.
Table 7.5-5. Topic Working Group Votes on the Revised M&S Standard
Center Representative Vote on
Credibility
Assessment Scale
Vote on
Remainder
ARC Unmeel Mehta Disapprove Can Live With
GRC Maria Babula Approve Approve
GSFC Gary Mosier Can Live With Can Live With
JPL William Bertch Disapprove Approve
JSC Andre Sylvester Approve Approve
KSC Martin Steele Approve Approve
LaRC Lawrence Green Approve Approve
MSFC Joe Hale Can Live With Approve
SSC Jody Woods Approve Approve
The reasons for the two disapprove votes on the credibility assessment scale were as follows
ARC
Objective h [assure that the credibility of models and simulations meet the project requirements]
is not met; there are questionable statements, such as "collectively they are nearly orthogonal,
i.e., Independent factors;" the roll-up is arbitrary; the decision maker is asked to assess
credibility; etc. See Section 10.2 for the alternative viewpoint on Version 5.
JPL
The input from the Chief Engineers from the various JPL directorates was that JPL did not want
to use the credibility assessment scale. As noted in formal comment #71, two studies and two
decision-maker interviews at JPL did not see a need for the credibility assessment scale. This is
not to say that the credibility assessment scale is bad, it is just that JPL is a very "flat"
organization and our decision makers are technical -- so they want to see the detailed numbers
for verification and validation (V&V), robustness, etc -- not a mapping to the levels associated
with the factors in the credibility assessment scale.
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The Topic Working Group submitted Version 5, along with the completed Comment Resolution
Matrix, to the NASA Technical Standards Program Office on November 16, 2007 as their final
deliverable. At this point the decision-making shifted to the EMB and the OCE.
7.5.2 Major Changes in the Revised M&S Standard
This subsection summarizes the major changes in the Revised M&S Standard (with respect to the
Interim M&S Standard) as a result of the pilot studies, the workshops on the credibility
assessment scale, and the NASA-wide review.
Section I Changes
There were numerous changes to increase the Scope understandability. (The changes have not
changed the Scope.)
• A single goal and eight objectives replaced the previous two goals and five objectives.
• The objectives were drawn directly from Diaz Action #4 and the NASA Chief Engineer
memo of September 1, 2006.
• The fonner Tables 1 and 2 were deleted.
• The relationship of this standard to NPR 7150.2 was clarified in Section 2.4.
• The applicability of the M&S Standard to COTS, GOTS, and MOTS tools was made
explicit.
Section 3 Changes
• Numerous acronyms were added.
• Numerous definitions were added.
• Some of the existing definitions were modified.
Section 4 Changes
• Many requirements had language changes to increase clarity.
• Several new requirements were added, requiring documentation for some aspects of the
new credibility assessment scale that were now covered by previous requirements (Regs.
4.1.4, 4.1.6, 4.3.8, and 4.3.11).
• Related new requirements were 4.3.9 and 4.3.10.
• Previous Req. 4.1.1 was placed in the text as an expectation, per guidance from the
TSPO.
• Previous Req. 4.1.7 was deleted.
• Previous Req. 4.1.5 was augmented and moved to Section 4.2.
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• Previous Req. 4.4.5 was split into four separate requirements that covered the same
material.
• All but one of the previous requirements (4.5.3) in Section 4.5 were dropped because of
concerns about cost (i.e., eight requirements were dropped in Section 4.5).
• Previous Reqs. 4.6.3, 4.6.4, and 4.6.5 were dropped.
• Req. 4.6.3 was added.
• Previous Req. 4.7.1 was split into two requirements.
• Req. 4.7.3 was added.
• The Summary Credibility Scale level definitions were deleted.
• Previous Reqs. 4.8.1, 4.8.2, and 4.8.5 were consolidated into a single requirement, now
Req. 4.8.1.
• Reqs. 4.8.2 and 4.8.3 were modified in accordance with changes to the credibility
assessment scale.
AppendixA Changes
This was completely rewritten.
• There was no longer a Summary Credibility Scale.
• There was now just one credibility assessment scale, not two credibility assessment
scales.
• The new credibility assessment scale had more factors than the A2 scale and fewer than
the A3 scale.
• The new credibility assessment scale had some factors that were present in the previous
credibility assessment scales.
• The new credibility assessment scale contained some factors that were not present in
either previous credibility assessment scale.
• The new credibility assessment scale had five levels (versus four levels for the previous
credibility assessment scales).
• The roll-up to a since number was a weighted average of the multidimensional factors,
whereas previously it was the minimum score of the factors.
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Appendix B Changes
The Requirement Traceability Matrix was placed online. A Compliance Matrix was used instead
in Appendix B.
7.6 Engineering Management Board Review
The EMB review occurred from January 22, 2008 through May 7, 2008. Initially, five Centers
concurred, and five Centers non-concurred. The principal concerns were:
1. A guidebook was wanted and not a standard.
2. Did not want any type of scale.
3. Felt the current credibility assessment scale was too subjective.
4. Felt many requirements were unverifiable.
The major issues were discussed at the May 7, 2008 EMB meeting.
7.6.1 Major Changes in the Permanent M&S Standard
The following major changes in the Permanent M&S Standard (with respect to the Revised M&S
Standard) were made as a result of this review:
Scope
• Added a new Appendix (now labeled Appendix A, with the previous Appendix A moving
to B, and the previous Appendix B moving to C) describing a sample M&S risk matrix.
• Added sentences to Sections 1.2 and 4.1 referring to this new appendix.
• Inserted a new Req. 4. 1.1 and modified Req. 4.1.2 (formerly 4.1.1) for consistency with
the new approach to scope determination.
Role of Technical Authority
• The role of Technical Authority was strengthened (in Section 4.1) with respect to
o Determining which M&S are in scope through the risk assessment,
o Determining the level of detail appropriate for meeting the documentation
requirements, and
o Determining the objectives and requirements for the M&S products (Req. 4.1.3).
Documentation Detail
• The sentence "The required documentation aspects for an activity that was not conducted
11701) be simply satisfied by recording that the activity was not conducted. " was removed
from the end of Section 4.0. (Some had interpreted this sentence to mean that all
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requirements for documentation could be satisfied merely by recording that the
documentation was not done.)
The sentence "Some requirements, in particular, 4.1.5, 4.2.6, 4.2.8, 4.3.6, 4.4.1, 4.4.2,
4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.4.6, 4.4.7, 4.4.8, and 4.4.9, are to be interpreted as meaning that the activity
in question is not required per se, but that whatever was done is to be documented, and if
nothing was done a clear statement to that effect is to be documented. " was added, and
wording changes were made to each of the listed requirements. This identifies
requirements referring to documentation of activities, such as uncertainty quantification,
that are not required; only the documentation of what, if anything, was done is required in
these cases.
Credibility Assessment Scale
The roll-up from the eight factor scores to the overall score was changed from a weighted
roll-up to the minimum score across the eight factors. This resulted in the deletion of 2-3
pages of text and deletion of three references and acronyms.
A paragraph was added to Section 4.7 to clarify the role of the Scale: "The operational concept
of the credibility assessment scale is that the presentation of any results from M&S to a decision
maker include (1) the best estimate of the results, (2) a statement on the uncertainty in the results,
(3) the evaluation of the results on the credibility assessment scale, and (4) any explicit caveats
that accompany the results. (An example of such a caveat would be use of the model in violation
of its assumptions.) The decision maker then makes his/her own assessment of credibility based
upon all four pieces of information in the context of the decision at hand. Just to emphasize this
fundamental point, the credibility assessment scale does not purport to measure credibility;
rather, it assesses the M&S results, and the rigor of the processes used to produce them, against
key factors that affect the credibility judgment. The fundamental premise of this approach is that
as a general rule, the more rigorous the key processes used for generating the M&S results, the
greater the credibility of the M&S results, all else (including the estimated uncertainty) being
equal. "
Four clarifications were added to the text of Appendix B to reduce ambiguity in the level
definitions.
Verifability Clarifications
Aegis, Inc. provided a detailed verifiability assessment of every requirement in the M&S
Standard. As a result of their comments, minor wording changes were made to about a
dozen requirements.
In addition, the former Req. 4.4.4 was folded into Req. 4.4.1, and the former Req. 4.4.8
was folded into the former Req. 4.4.5 (now Req. 4.4.4), to reduce ambiguity.
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New Requirement
• Req. 4.2.13 was added by the Topic Working Group during the review of the language
changes. The Topic Working Group felt that this information also needed to be in
configuration management along with the related information in Req. 4.2.12.
7.6.2 Risk Assessment Matrix
At a March 27, 2008 meeting, the NASA Chief Engineer suggested to the Chair of the Topic
Working Group that the determination of which M&S lie within scope of the M&S Standard be
perfortned by an assessment of the risk incurred by the use of the M&S results. Figure 7.6-7
illustrates the sample risk assessment matrix that was added to the Permanent M&S Standard for
this purpose. The standard leaves the choice of the number of levels for Decision Consequence
up to the Program/Project. The sample uses Decision Consequence level definitions adapted
from those in NPR 8000.4, which is the only specific risk matrix in a NASA guidance document.
See Appendix D for the precise text in that NPR at the time this adaptation was made.
5: Controlling (G) (Y) (R) (R)
M&S 4: Significant (G) (Y) (R) (R)
Results 3: Moderate (G)i (Y) (Y) (R)
Influence 2: Minor (G)' (G)^ (Y) (Y)
1: Negligible (G) (G) (G) (G)
IV: Negligible III: Marginal II: Critical I: Catastrophic
Decision Consequence
Figure 7.6-7. Sample M&S Risk Assessment Matrix
7.6.3 Issuance of Permanent M&S Standard
The Permanent M&S Standard, incorporating the changes described in Section 7.6.1, was
reviewed once more by the EMB in late June 2008. No objections were recorded. The NASA
Chief Engineer formally issued the Pennanent M&S Standard on July 11, 2008.
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7.7 Outreach
Over the course of this activity numerous presentations were made at conferences and
professional society meetings on aspects of the M&S Standard. These include presentations at
the
- Finite Element Modeling Continuous Improvement Workshop [Zang, October 2006]
- AIAA Standards Technical Committee [Mehta, January 2007]
- Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) Simulation Interoperability
Workshop [Zang, March 2007]
- Finite Elements in Fluids Conference [Green, March 2007]
- ASME Committee on Verification and Validation in Computational Solid Mechanics
[Zang, March 2007]
- Joint Army, Navy, NASA, Air Force (JANNAF) Modeling and Simulation
Subcommittee Meeting [Hale, May 2007]
- JANNAF Modeling and Simulation Subcommittee Meeting [Mehta, May 2007]
- Society for Modeling and Simulation International (SCS) Summer Computer Simulation
Conference [Steele, July 2007]
- Sandia National Laboratories Workshop on Mathematical Methods in V&V [Zang,
August 2007]
- SISO Simulation Interoperability Workshop VV&A Summit [Hale, September 2007]
- SISO Simulation Interoperability WorkshopVV&A Summit [Zang, September 2007]
- AIAA Nondeterministic Approaches Conference [Luckring, April 2008]
- SISO Simulation Interoperability Workshop [Bertch, April 2008]
- SISO Simulation Interoperability Workshop [Hale, April 2008]
- SISO-SCS International Simulation Multi-conference [Steele, June 2008]
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8.0 Overview of the Permanent M&S Standard
The overall goal of this Standard is to ensure that the credibility of the results from M&S is
properly conveyed to those making critical decisions. That is, requirements are identified to
ensure the development, operation, and documentation are properly addressed, but the critical
requirements specify what is to be presented to the decision-makers. Having requirements on the
presentation is a rather unique approach for a standard, but gets to the heart of the issues raised
in the CAIB report where the information was not properly conveyed to the decision-makers.
The main body of the M&S Standard consists of two parts as shown in Figure 8.0-1. The first
part addresses the conventional set of requirements for M&S projects. The second part addresses
the use of a credibility assessment scale that was included to make the M&S credibility more
apparent to the decision-maker with the anticipation that this can expose the risk associated with
M&S-based decisions. This section discusses each part in turn, after discussion the Scope and
Definitions sections.
8 Requirement Sections in M&S Standard
PART 9
Core requirements
to be met
regardless of
Credibility Level
Required
• Programmatic
• Model Documentation
• Simulation Documentation
• Verification, Validation &
Uncertainty Quantification
• Recommended Practices
• Training
• Credibility Scale
• Reporting to Decision Makers
Credibility Scale
M&S Results Credibility
Uerititation Validation c	 Input	 Results	 ResultsPedigree	 Uncertainty	 Robuslltess
Use	 M8S	 People
History	 Management a.; ficafions t
M&S
Development
M&S
Operations
snppnnmg
Evidence	 /
PART ?
Credibility Scale
with 8 factors having
graduated levels
(Level 0 to 4)
Figure 8.0-1. Two Parts of the M&S Standard
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8.1 Scope
Determination and articulation of the scope of this standard was a challenging and iterative task.
One month after the start of Phase 1, on June 14, 2005, the Development Team met with the
OCE liaison at the time (Michael Blythe) to seek guidance on the scope. His general guidance
was to stick to the intent of the Diaz Action #4 (i.e., on M&S used for decisions affecting human
safety and mission success). The implication was that the Development Team should not take
Diaz Action #4 as a license to address broader M&S concerns.
The major question that the Development Team had was whether the scope included software
used for control systems and displays. This was ruled out of scope by the OCE liaison. The
following information was used to facilitate the refinement of the scope during this June 2005
discussion:
M&S Uses in Engineering
• Technology Investment (out ofscope)
Identify and evaluate candidate advanced technologies for future missions and systems
• Acquisition (out of scope)
Specify and acquire new systems
• Analysis & Design (in scope, Priority Level 2)
Evaluate and explore solution spaces for current and future systems and subsystems
• Test & Evaluation (in scope, Priority Level 2)
Evaluate/verify hardware & software artifacts
• Training (probably out of scope)
Produce learning in a user or participant
• Engineering/Operations (in scope, Priority Level 1)
Evaluate status/anomalies/corrective actions in operational systems
M&S Uses in Science
• Scientific Data Analysis (out of scope)
Process data from scientific instruments
• Scientific Understanding (out of scope)
Simulation of natural phenomena used for advancement of scientific knowledge
• Natural Phenomena Prediction (partly in scope, Priority Level 3)
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Simulation of natural phenomena used for operational decisions affecting safety and
mission success
Predictions of the operational environment that have a direct impact on the safety of
personnel and NASA assets are in scope provided that NASA has primary responsibility
for these predictions —space weather is an example
Simulations for which other agencies have primary responsibility are out of scope
Earth weather is an example
The guidance from Michael Blythe is recorded in the italicized comments in parentheses. A day
after this meeting, Michael Blythe met with the Deputy Chief Engineer, Gregory Robinson, who
confirmed this guidance, but did indicate that the stimulation environment (often consisting of
M&S) for control systems was in scope.
Although the previously identified information provided general clarification to the sense of the
scope, and appeared in a revised form in the Interim M&S Standard, they proved to be unclear to
a number of the commenters during the formal review. As expected, there were numerous formal
comments on the Scope and Applicability of the M&S Standard. Many of these comments fell
into one of three categories: (1) objections to the breadth of the scope, (2) inability to understand
the scope, and (3) questions about the relationship to NPR 7150.2, Software Engineering
Procedures.
In responding to (1), the Topic Working Group sought additional guidance from Hal Bell, as this
is a policy rather than a technical decision. Because of (2), the Topic Working Group chose to
greatly simplify the articulation of the scope in the Revised M&S Standard; see Section 6 in the
standard for the final language. As noted in Section 7.6.2, an additional refinement to the
Scope—the connection to an M&S risk assessment—was made as a result of the EMB review.
For (3), the Topic Working Group determined that there was very little overlap, and no outright
contraction, between the two documents. (An independent assessment conducted by Milton
Lavin at JPL, albeit in the context of comparing the M&S Standard with JPL's internal
implementation guidelines for NPR 7150.2, reached the same conclusion.) In particular, the NPR
has one general requirement to "test, validate, and certify software models, simulations, and
analysis tools [requirement SWE-070]", and it does not mention uncertainty quantification. On
the other hand, the M&S Standard has a limited number of software-specific requirements such
as providing version control and use of a configuration management system. Thus, the two
documents are complementary, with the M&S Standard providing requirements for all the
aspects of M&S that have more to do with the scientific method than with software engineering.
Discussions with the NASA official responsible for NPR 7150.2 (John Kelly) led to inclusion of
the following language in the M&S Standard: "implementation plans for NPR 7150.2 ... should
... address such M&S-specific issues as numerical accuracy, uncertainty analysis, sensitivity
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analysis, M&S verification and M&S validation" to emphasize these M&S specific
requirements.
As discussed in Section 7.6.2, the Permanent M&S Standard added the use of a risk assessment
process for determination of which M&S are in Scope.
8.2 Definitions
The approach taken to the definitions that appear in Section 3.2 of the M&S Standard was to use
definitions from the M&S community (and not from the systems engineering, software
engineering, or statistics communities). Where available and appropriate, these definitions were
extracted from Agency level directives as found on the NASA Online Directives Information
System. In most other cases, they were taken or adapted from consensus publications, such as
professional society guides.
8.3 Requirements
The requirements section consists of forty-nine requirements separated into eight subsections.
The first six subsections provide the underlying activities that support the credibility assessment
requirements in subsection 7, and subsection 8 addresses the reporting of M&S results to the
decision makers.
The introductory material for each requirements section includes a discussion of the intent of the
requirements in that section. Thirty-three of these requirements start with the words "shall
document." Twelve of these, in particular, 4.1.5, 4.2.6, 4.2.8, 4.3.6, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.4, 4.4.5,
4.4.6, 4.4.7, 4.4.8, and 4.4.9, are to be interpreted as meaning that the activity in question is not
required per se, but that whatever was done is to be documented, and if nothing was done a clear
statement to that effect is to be documented.
The first requirements subsection addresses pl°ogMmmatic activities. The most fundamental
activity is for the project management in collaboration with the Technical Authority to identify
and document the critical decisions to be addressed with M&S and to determine which M&S are
in scope. The latter determination should be based upon the risk posed by the anticipated use of
the M&S, using the risk assessment approach discussed in Section 7.6.2. These requirements
oblige the Project to: 1) identify the M&S that are in scope, 2) define the objectives and
requirements for the M&S, and 3) develop a plan for the acquisition, development, operation,
maintenance, and/or retirement of the M&S.
The second requirements subsection addresses the requirements imposed on the model, where
model refers to the conceptual model, the mathematical model, and the computational model.
The majority of these requirements address documentation for the assumptions, basic structure,
mathematics, data sets, limits of operation, guidance in the proper use of the model, parameter
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calibrations, model updates, and methods for uncertainty quantification for any data used to
develop the model or incorporated into the model.
The third requirements subsection addresses the requirements imposed on the simulation. This
includes requirements addressing the limits of operation, pedigree of the input data, processes for
executing the simulations, processes for conducting analyses, assessment of the appropriateness
of the simulation relative to its intended use, and use history of the M&S.
The fourth requirements subsection addresses the verification, validation, and uncertainty
quantification. M&S practitioners typically understand the nuances of these requirements for
their particular type of M&S. Specific emphasis is given to communicating the domains of
verification and validation of the model to assure appropriate application of the model.
Furthermore, documentation of the uncertainties in the results and their sensitivities is required.
The fifth requirements subsection of the M&S Standard addresses the use of recommended
practices. The sixth requirements subsection addresses training for developers, operators, and
analysts. (Both topics were explicitly specified in the Diaz Action #4.)
The seventh requirements subsection addresses the credibility assessment scale. The
requirements specify that the M&S results and processes be assessed on the credibility
assessment scale defined in Appendix B of the M&S Standard.
The eighth and final requirements subsection addresses the reporting of results to decision
makers. This is the key activity driven by this M&S Standard. This is discussed in more detail in
Section 8.4.
8.4 Credibility Assessment Scale
The operational concept of the credibility assessment scale is that the presentation of any results
from M&S to a decision-maker would include: (1) the best estimate of the results, (2) a statement
on the uncertainty in the results, (3) the evaluation of the results on the credibility assessment
scale, and (4) any explicit caveats that accompany the results. (An example of such a caveat
would be use of the model in violation of its assumptions.) The decision-maker then makes his
assessment of credibility based upon all four pieces of information in the context of the decision
at hand. Just to emphasize this fundamental point, the credibility assessment scale does not
purport to measure credibility; rather, it assesses the M&S results, and the processes used to
produce them, against key factors that affect the credibility judgment. The Topic Working Group
stresses that the goal of this scale is to assist in the assessment of the credibility of the particular
results at hand and not to assist in a broad certification (or accreditation as some prefer to call it)
decision for a class of uses of the M&S.
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See Sections 7.2.3 and 7.3.2 for the background and basic decisions made the Development
Team and the Topic Working Group on the two credibility assessment scales that appeared in the
Interim M&S Standard. Section 7.5 provides a lengthy summary of the Topic Working Group's
revision during Phase 2. The basic features of the credibility assessment scale are provided in the
bottom half of Figure 8.0-1. See the Permanent M&S Standard itself [ref. 5] for the detailed
explanation of the factors, the level definitions and the roll-up process.
As noted in Section 7.4.3, the Topic Working Group considered nearly 100 separate factors,
obviously far too long a list. It is well beyond the Magical Number Seven (Plus or Minus Two)
rule of Miller [ref. 23]. Of all the many candidate factors that did not make the final list, two of
those merit special comment—accuracy and fidelity. These candidate factors were suggested in
some Decision-maker Interviews and Pilot Scale Questionnaire responses.
Accuracy rated in the top 16 at the KSC workshop. However, the Topic Working Group judged
that it and uncertainty were not sufficiently orthogonal. Fidelity, on the other hand, did not rank
in the top quartile.
8.5 Traceability
Section 6 lists the objectives for the M&S Standard, as provided by Diaz Action #4 and the
memo from the NASA Chief Engineer. A traceability matrix that links the requirements in the
M&S Standard with the Diaz Action #4 details the Chief Engineer's direction to include a
credibility assessment scale is famished in Appendix E.
Some aspects of Diaz Action #4 are covered rather sparsely by explicit requirements in the M&S
Standard. These are to
- Identify best practices to ensure that knowledge of operations is captured in the user
interfaces (e.g. users are not able to enter parameters that are out of bounds)
- Develop a process for user feedback when results appear unrealistic or defy explanation
It is a practical impossibility to construct a general method for ensuring that M&S are not used
with parameters that are out of bounds (i.e., outside the limits of operation of the M&S). There
are M&S Standard requirements (Regs. 4.2.5, 4.2.7, 4.3.1, 4.5.1 and 4.8. 1) and recommendations
(4.3b, 4.3c, 4.5j, 4.6a) that establish precautions to reduce the likelihood of using M&S with
parameters that are out of bounds. The items left to recommendations are ones that may not be
technically or practically feasible in all cases.
Furthermore, the certification/recertification aspect of the following part of the Diaz Action #4
has deliberately not been addressed by means of an explicit requirement for certification.
- Develop process for tool verification and validation, certification, reverification,
revalidation, and recertification based on operational data and trending
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Rather, Req. 4.1.3a addresses this obliquely, leaving the decision on whether any type of
endorsement, including certification, up to the Program/Project and the Technical Authority.
This was done at the explicit direction of the OCE.
9.0 Observations, Findings and Recommendations
The Observations, Findings and Recommendations are listed separately for the Development
Team and the Topic Working Group. The listed Recommendations are directed towards the
NASA Chief Engineer unless otherwise identified.
9.1 Summary of Observations and Findings
The following Observations and Findings were identified earlier in this document, and are
recorded below for completeness.
DeiYelo1Jment Team Obser i atlons and Findings:
0-1. Development of a rigor scale is extremely difficult, even for a small, homogeneous
group, and even restricted to M&S using PDE-based mathematical models.
0-2. The credibility assessment scale is not a standalone assessment of factors influencing
credibility, but rather the credibility assessment scale plus the uncertainty statement
combine to influence the credibility assessment by the decision-maker.
0-3. Frequent face-to-face meetings were essential for the initial formulation of the M&S
Standard.
0-4. Many engineers and program managers at NASA are unaware of the intended
hierarchy of the agency guidance documents.
0-5. Many engineers at NASA are unaware of standards that are relevant to their work.
F-1. Current NASA guidance is oriented towards control systems and displays. Quality
assurance and configuration management are very well covered, but the unique,
critical aspects of M&S are not addressed, for example, validation against
experimental or flight data, and uncertainty quantification.
F-2. No federal agency has an M&S Standard, although the DoD has extensive M&S
guidance, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has standards for control
systems and displays.
F-3. Relevant M&S guidance is strongly focused on the development phase of the M&S
life-cycle, and especially upon verification and validation. There is little guidance on
the operations of M&S and virtually no guidance on the maintenance of M&S.
F-4. NASA has no policy nor any procedural requirements for M&S except for the
software engineering aspects of M&S covered by NPD 2820.15 and NPR 7150.2.
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F-5. There does not presently exist an M&S scale with the specific objectives desired for
the M&S Standard.
Topic Working Group Obseri ations and Findings:
0-6. The credibility assessment scale is outside the formal Diaz Action #4.
F-6. The definition of a Topic Working Group consensus in the NASA Interim Directive
on Interim NASA Technical Standards is not sufficiently precise.
F-7. There is a substantial literature on M&S credibility and/or scales, several other
attempts, and numerous "lessons learned" on this subject.
9.2 Development Team Recommendations
R-1. NASA should integrate the M&S Standard into the NASA guidance hierarchy.
The initial review of existing M&S guidance and standards (Section 7.2.1) made it apparent that
the M&S Standard was not tied to any existing NPD or NPR. The most logical existing NPR that
could link to the M&S Standard would be NPR 7123. IA (NASA Systems Engineering Processes
and Requirements). Either the M&S Standard should be linked to an NPD, a future version of
NPR 7123.1 A or to a forthcoming NPR on NASA standards.
R-2. NASA should coordinate with other organizations and professional societies to
further mature the M&S Standard.
The development and operation of M&S, the analysis and presentation of M&S results, the
proper training of M&S practitioners, the identification of recommended practices, and the need
for assessing and conveying the credibility of M&S results to decision makers are not unique to
NASA. These aspects of the M&S process are common to many other organizations. NASA
should participate in activities directed towards standards that serve a broader M&S community.
R-3. NASA should sponsor development of Recommended Practices Guides.
While some M&S have well established and documented procedures, many others do not.
Furthermore, existing guidelines may not cover new applications of the M&S. For example,
models often require calibration, or numerical parameters need to be tuned for new problems.
Knowledge of these procedures, calibrations, and tunings often resides in a small subset of
workers. NASA should identify M&S domains that need Recommended Practice Guides and
coordinate with professional societies, academia, commercial and international partners to
develop them. (Domains may be organized according to type of M&S, by discipline, or by
application.)
R-4. NASA should re-assess the requirements on recommended practices that were
removed from the Interim M&S Standard.
NESC Request No.: 06-005-E
NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:0 Technical Report  RP-08-118 1.0
Title: Pale #:
M&S Standard Completion 53 of 112
The Interim M&S Standard contained nine requirements for the Recommended Practices section.
Eight of these requirements were deleted in the final Standard. What is left is merely the
requirement to identify existing applicable RPGs. Greater discipline in the use of M&S is best
fostered by development of new RPGs where needed. This can be a key element in training of
developers, operators and analysts.
R-5. NASA should refine how submodels are treated in the credibility assessment scale.
The present version of the M&S Standard makes no distinction between individual models and
integrated models consisting of multiple submodels. The roll-up of assessments of the individual
submodels into the assessment of the integrated model is primarily an issue for the credibility
assessment scale. The credibility assessment should eventually be refined to account for the
additional issues associated with integration of submodels.
R-6. Information regarding credibility assessment scale usage should be collected to
determine effectiveness and provide data for further revision.
In general, scales measuring the rigor, credibility, or similar aspects of M&S results have not
received much use, and there is no consensus on such assessments. In particular, the credibility
assessment scale in the M&S Standard has not been used. The immaturity of this particular field
necessitates close monitoring of the impact of credibility assessment scale usage by NASA
programs and the use of that information to update the credibility assessment scale. This is not a
criticism of the present credibility assessment scale, but merely an acknowledgment of the state
of such assessments; operational use is essential to advance the state-of—the-art.
R-7. NASA should clarify the operational meaning of the term "consensus" in NASA
Interim Directive on Interim NASA Technical Standards.
As noted above in F-6 the directive requires a Topic Working Group "consensus", but does not
give a sufficiently precise definition of this term. A definition with a clear, operational meaning
is needed.
9.3 Topic Working Group Recommendations
Some recommendations below are similar to the Development Team, but are recorded as well for
reinforcement and/or clarification
R-8. NASA should sponsor the development of Recommended Practices Guides along
disciplinary lines. This responsibility might best be delegated to the NASA
Technical Fellows.
See R-3 for the rationale. The Topic Working Group supplemented this with a particular
suggestion of who might be tasked with this responsibility. This does not necessarily mean that
the NASA Technical Fellows should personally develop the guides appropriate for their
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disciplines, but merely they should have the responsibility (and budget) for ensuring that they are
produced.
R-9. NASA should collect data on the scope decisions, the cost impact and the credibility
assessment scale usage of the M&S Standard.
This is a more general recommendation than R-6. The extension to collection of data on the
scope decisions and cost impact was motivated by the large number of comments on these topics
submitted as part of the Agency-wide review.
R-10. NASA should develop, by application domain, an M&S "validation lessons learned"
database.
This information would be used to develop guidelines allowing designers to intelligently balance
risk versus conservatism during program/project formulation. Solid data and rationale for design
margins exist, in the form of written guidelines at the agency level, for only a few of the many
application domains (i.e., disciplines). Of particular interest is the knowledge of why and by how
much M&S results were in error before the models were tuned/correlated. NASA should also
implement a process by which the guidelines are continuously re-evaluated and updated as the
database grows.
R-11. An NPD and/or NPR should call out the M&S Standard.
See R-1 for the rationale.
R-12. Centers should share with each other their plans and other guidance for
implementation of the M&S Standard.
The M&S Standard is a first-of-its-kind document, and there are few existing Recommended
Practices Guides for M&S. NASA would make more effective use of the M&S Standard by
sharing the individual Center implementation plans and guidance documents than by having each
Center work this independently.
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10.0 Alternate Viewpoints
10.1 Alternate Viewpoint (Unmeel Mehta) on the Interim M&S Standard
See Appendix C for the minority opinion on the Interim M&S Standard.
10.2 Alternate Viewpoint (Unmeel Mehta) on the Revised M&S Standard
Because of the following four reasons, Version 5 is not appropriate as a standard.
The method to assess the credibility of M&S results presented in credibility assessment
scale (Appendix A) and the associated requirements in Section 4 are questionable. The
method is subjective, complex, and unsound. It leads to non-unifonn/non-standard
credibility/quality assessment of M&S results. The method does not provide the
credibility assessment, instead the decision maker is asked to make the assessment. The
method and requirements do not fiilfill Objectives (g) and (h).
Version 5 does not focus on outcome. The method for credibility assessment is output
based rather than perfonnance (outcome) based. M&S results are procured for
engineering efforts, including for making critical decisions. The NASA policy is to prefer
use of performance (outcome-based) standards in procurement activities over design or
process (method-based) standards (NPD 8070.613 for Technical Standards).
The development of processesa stated objective—is not met. The required processes
for validation, verification, uncertainty quantification, certification, etc. are not presented.
Among a total of 49 requirements, 39 requirements are for documentation. Without
proper processes, documentation by itself does assure quality of M&S results.
4. Version 5 does not meet the definition of a Standard. It does not address all stated
objectives. Waivers, tailoring, factor weights, and the availability of option not to
quantify uncertainties make this version a non-standard. A uniform engineering and
technical requirement, a necessary condition for a standard, is not established. Please see
the definition of NASA engineering standard and the applicability statement in the
Applicability section of SAE AS 9100, Rev. B.
The questionable method for credibility assessment of M&S results for critical decision, the
failure to address Objective (h), the failure to focus on performance, non-uniform applicability of
Version 5, and the focus on documentation provide questionable value to the program and the
Agency.
10.3 Alternate Recommendation (Unmeel Mehta)
The composition of the Topic Working Group and the selection of members for this Group
should be done very judiciously to achieve a highly successful outcome.
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The composition of Topic Working Group and the selection of members for this Group should
be done judiciously, including built-in checks-and-balances, to achieve a highly successful
outcome. The guidance for selection of Topic Working Group is as follows: The Topic Working
Group to develop a NASA M&S Standard should have seven members with extensive
experience in development and use of M&S and three members with extensive experience as
program or project leads who have used M&S results for engineering and for critical decisions.
Among the six M&S experts, three disciplines should be addressed, with two experts in each of
the three disciplines. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) and Computational Solid Mechanics
(CSM) are examples of disciplines to include. The Topic Working Group lead, the tenth person,
should be the person with M&S expertise and from the discipline that is the most used within the
Agency. This person should also not be the leader of the Development Team for M&S standard
and should be from a center other than that of the Development Team lead. The latter person
should be a Topic Working Group member. There should also be only one representative from
each Center, with each member having the voting right.
11.0 Other Deliverables
This section first lists the final documents delivered under this task. Then, since the pilot studies
in Spring 2007 were such important input to this process, the two questionnaires are recorded
and the results from these are summarized. The decision-maker interviews conducted during the
same period were also influential. These are also recorded here. Some of the background
information on the questionnaire that is redundant for this report has been omitted below;
bracketed, italicized notes indicate the locations and content of these deletions.
11.1 Standard Documents
The deliverable from the Development Team for their part of this task was Version 3, which was
submitted to OCE on August 15, 2006.
The primary deliverable from the Topic Working Group for their part of this task was the
document—the Revised M&S Standard—for the proposed NASA Standard for Models and
Simulations (which underwent some subsequent modifications as a result of the EMB review).
This document was delivered to the NASA Technical Standards Program Office on November
16, 2007, along with the Comment Resolution Matrix, which documented the Topic Working
Group decisions on the formal comments submitted during the NASA-wide review.
The secondary deliverable from the Topic Working Group was the document for the Interim
NASA Standard for Models and Simulations, which was delivered to the NASA Technical
Standards Program Office on October 11, 2006.
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After implementing the changes resulting from the EMB review, the final document—the
Permanent M&S Standard—was delivered to the NASA Technical Standards Program Office on
May 23, 2008. Also included were the updated Comment Resolution Matrix, the Traceability
Matrix (for posting on the web), an overview briefing for M&S practitioners, and an assessment
questionnaire for evaluating the M&S Standard in actual use on M&S projects (accompanied by
a worksheet for assessing its cost impact of the M&S Standard).
The Traceability Matrix is included in this report in Appendix E. The assessment questionnaire
was adapted from the ones used in the pilot studies of the Interim M&S Standard (given here in
Appendices E and G). The cost impact worksheet requires that one of the following three
assessments be made for each requirement in the M&S Standard:
• Do This Already
• Don't Do This: Minimal New Cost
• Don't Do This: New Cost Driver
11.2 Pilot Scale Questionnaire
The questionnaire is provided in Appendix F and summarizes the results and conclusions. In
interpreting the results, note that term "category" used in the questionnaire is equivalent to the
term "factor" used in the final credibility assessment scale. (Compare the guidance in the second
paragraph of the Introduction segment of Section 11.2.1 with the terminology used in the Interim
M&S Standard.)
Two of the responses to this questionnaire were from members of the Development Team
responsible for the A2 scale. Their responses are not included in this summary. There were 14
other responses. The answers to the multiple-choice questions are summarized in two different
graphical fortnats.
Hi _uire 11.2-1 uses a bar plot to summarize the data, whereas Figure 11.2-2 uses a mosaic plot.
For example, on question 45, the responses were: 7 for (a); 5 for (b); and 3 for (c). The questions
not shown in this figure were open ended rather than multiple choice. Note that the responses on
this questionnaire are only indirectly relevant to the credibility assessment scale in the Permanent
M&S Standard, as that credibility assessment scale is substantially different from both credibility
assessment scales in the Interim M&S Standard.
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Figure 11.2-1. Bar Chart of Results from the Pilot Scale Questionnaire
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Figure 11.2-2. Mosaic Plot of Results from the Pilot Scale Questionnaire
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Individual Topic Working Group members voiced their conclusions below from the review of
the Pilot Scale Questionnaire:
• The current scales are not good enough based on the results of Q  I—Q16
• Number of categories should be less than 10 (Q8)
• No one wants to give equal weight to all categories (Q20)
• No one wants to give the minimum should be weighted, or mean and min/max (Q21)
• A2 is more understandable than A3 (Q1 and Q2)
• Both scales work about as well for coupled, with a slight advantage to A21 (Q9 and Q10)
• Split opinion on question of roll-up and whether it meets the goals (Q1 I—Q 16)
• There were some comments on what were the most important categories that we should
pay attention to
Note that these were individual conclusions and not necessarily consensus Topic Working Group
conclusions.
11.3 Decision-Maker Interviews
The Decision-Maker Interview Guide itself is provided in Appendix G. At the Scale Workshop
3, the Topic Working Group members reported the main points from the interviews that they had
conducted. Then, the following list was made of potential factors that were emphasized in the
decision-maker interviews:
• Accuracy—error bars—uncertainty
• Fidelity of model
• Verification and validation
• Qualifications of people doing the work
• Fit intended use
• Validation of input
• Independent review or analysis
• Validate against real-world data
• Traceability to past knowledge
• Use history of model
11.4 Pilot Questionnaire
The principal product from the Pilot Studies was the responses on the Pilot Questionnaire. The
questionnaire itself is provided in Appendix H.
A constant refrain during the years of development of this standard was that it would cost too
much. Hence, the purpose of questions 7-11 and 13-16 was to elicit estimates of the impact of
this standard on the cost of the M&S. There were 8 responses to questions 7-11. All used the A2
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scale as the context for their estimates. Table 11.4-1 gives the quantitative estimates collected
from the pilot teams for the estimated cost impact to achieve Level 1 on the A2 scale.
Table 11.4-1. Raw Data for Cost Estimates for Level 1
Minimum Most Likely Maximum
ARC-Holst 1.05 1.08 1.10
GSFC-Liu 1.05 1.10 1.20
JPL-Aquarius 2.00 2.20 3.00
JPL-Kepler 1.00 1.00 1.00
JPL-MER-EDL 1.05 1.06 1.10
JPL-MER-Thennal 1.00 1.00 1.00
KSC-SpaceNet 1.40 1.50 1.60
MSFC-Nix 1.02 1.03 1.05
These data were each converted to a triangular probability density function (PDF), and then these
were averaged to fonn the overall PDF. Finally, the overall PDF was integrated to construct the
cumulative density function (CDF).
Relative Cost
Figure 11.4-1. Estimate of Cost to Achieve Level 1 on the A2 Scale
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Figure 11.4-2. Estimate of Cost to Achieve Level 3 on the A2 Scale
H7-ure 11.4-1 shows the CDF for the estimated cost to achieve Level 1, and Fi gure 11.4-2 does
the same for achieving Level 3. Although these estimates are not for the credibility assessment
scale in the Permanent M&S Standard, the estimates for Level 1 on the A2 scale do apply
directly to achieving Level 0 on the final credibility assessment scale. The reason is that Level 1
on the A2 scale and Level 0 on the final credibility assessment scale correspond to merely
satisfying the requirements in the M&S Standard, which themselves only require documentation
and reporting. The estimate for Level 3 on the A2 scale is roughly comparable to achievement of
Level 3 on the credibility assessment scale, because both require substantial activities over and
above the documentation and reporting requirements.
The cost estimates for merely satisfying the documentation and reporting requirements, shown in
Figure 11.4-1, suggest that in tNvo-thirds of the cases, the additional cost to the M&S project will
be less than 10 percent. Furthermore, the M&S projects that reported the least cost impact turned
out to be those that are used in major development projects, whereas those that report the most
cost impact are closer to the research code stage. The cost impacts shown in Figure 11.4-2 are
much more substantial. But, presumably such a high level on the credibility assessment scale
would only be required for the most critical decisions.
These cost estimates are only theoretical, but they are based on all the data that was submitted
during the pilot studies. Information on the actual cost impact of the M&S Standard awaits
practical experience with it.
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12.0 Lessons Learned
Lessons learned from Phase 2 include:
1. Developing an M&S Standard that covers all types of models and simulations and all
phases of the modeling and simulation process is extremely challenging.
2. Of the various challenges of developing a scale, i.e., picking an architecture, choosing the
factors, and writing the level definitions, the hardest is writing clear, objective level
definitions. This is easily overlooked by those new to such an activity.
Trained facilitation was extremely useful in containing the passionate "discussions" about
the scale.
4. Once a decision is made, the temptation to revisit that decision is only contained by a
firm rule requiring a formal motion accompanied by a second to even to begin the
discussion.
Pilot studies are very important in bringing practical experience to bear on the
development of a new standard.
6. The supermajority rule for final decisions is critical to ensuring that the final product had
consensus support from the Topic Working Group.
7. Dedicated funding (as opposed to a volunteer activity) and involvement of practitioners
was extremely beneficial to ensuring a feasible standard that would be accepted by the
M&S community.
8. A high-level champion, in this case the OCE, was indispensable to overcoming barriers.
13.0 Definition of Terms
Corrective Actions 	 Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices,
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools,
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing,
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.
Finding	 A conclusion based on facts established by the investigating authority.
Lessons Learned	 Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may
be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap
or failure. A lesson must be siLmificant in that it has real or assumed
impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct;
and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision
that reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a
positive result.
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Observation A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the assessment that did
not contribute to the problem, but if left uncorrected has the potential to
cause a mishap, injury, or increase the severity should a mishap occur.
Alternatively, an observation could be a positive acknowledgement of a
Center/Program/Project/Organization's operational structure, tools, and/or
support provided.
Problem The subject of the independent technical assessment/inspection.
Proximate Cause The event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that existed
immediately before the undesired outcome, directly resulted in its
occurrence and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the
undesired outcome.
Recommendation An action identified by the assessment team to correct a root cause or
deficiency identified during the investigation. The recommendations may
be used by the responsible Center/Program/Project/Organization in the
preparation of a corrective action plan.
Root Cause One of multiple factors (events, conditions, or organizational factors) that
contributed to or created the proximate cause and subsequent undesired
outcome and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the
undesired outcome. Typically, multiple root causes contribute to an
undesired outcome.
14.0 Acronyms List
AIAA	 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
ARC Ames Research Center
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation Board
CDF Cumulative Density Function
COTS Commerical-Off-The-Shelf
DFRC Dryden Flight Research Center
DMSO Defense Modeling and Simulation Office
DoD Department of Defense
DoE Department of Energy
EDL Entry, Descent and Landing
EMB Engineering Management Board
FY Fiscal Year
GOTS Government-Off-The-Shelf
GRC Glenn Research Center
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center
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ICD Interface Configuration Document
IM&S Integrated Modeling and Simulation
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory
LaRC Langley Research Center
M&S Models and Simulations
MER Mars Exploration Rover
MOTS Modified-Off-The-Shelf
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
NASA NASA Aeronautics and Space Administration
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center
NPD NASA Policy Document
NPR NASA Procedural Requirement
NRB NESC Review Board
OCE Office of the Chief Engineer
PCMM Predictive Capability Maturity Model
PDF Probability Density Function
RCC Reinforced Carbon-Carbon
RPG Recommended Practices Guide
RTF Return To Flight
SRL Simulation Readiness Level
SSC Stennis Space Center
TSPO Technical Standards Program Office
TSWG Technical Standards Working Group
VPMM Validation Process Maturity Model
VV&A Verification, Validation and Accreditation
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Appendix A. NASA Chief Engineer Memo
September 1, 2006
Office of the Chief Engineer
TO:	 Distribution
FROM:	 Chief Engineer
SUBJECT: NASA Standard for Models and Simulations (M&S)
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) is coordinating the development of a NASA
Standard which will provide criteria for use of M&S. Addressing the findings and
recommendations from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, we need requirements that
will improve our ability to develop, validate, and maintain computer models. The Chief Engineer
has an action to establish Agency M&S requirements by the end of fiscal year 2006.
The M&S Standard will
â Ensure that the credibility of M&S results is properly conveyed to those making critical
decisions,
â Assure that the credibility of M&S meet the project requirements,
â Establish M&S requirements and recommendations that will forth a strong foundation for
disciplined (structure, management, control) development, validation and use of M&S
within NASA and its contractor community,
â Include a standard method to assess the credibility of the M&S presented to the decision
maker when making critical decisions (i.e., decisions that effect human safety or mission
success) using results from M&S,
â Establish a common set of terms and a uniform way for M&S practitioners to communicate
the credibility of M&S,
Be responsive to Diaz Action #4.
The standard development is in its final stages, with only a few, but critical, issues left to be
resolved. As issuance of this standard is time criticalit is my desire that it be completed before
the end of September 2006. I am requesting that the Topic Working Group members from the
Centers make this their top priority for the rest of this fiscal year. In practice this means that they
participate fully (via telecon) in all decisional meetings. I anticipate that there will be weekly
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decisional meetings during September. I ask the Engineering Management Board members to
ensure that their Centers' Topic Working Group members can make this commitment, and, if
not, to identify an alternate or replacement.
Questions related to the processing of the draft M&S Standard should be addressed to Tom Zang,
Thomas. A.Zangknasa.gov
 at the NASA Langley Research Center.
Original signed by
Christopher J. Scolese
Enclosure
Distribution:
En2ineeriniz Management Board (EMS) Members
Ames Research Center/Doty, Laura
Dryden Flight Research Center/Stoliker, Patrick C.
Glenn Research Center/Gonzalez-Sanabria, Olga D.
Goddard Space Flight Center/Figueroa, Orlando
Jet Propulsion Laboratory/Muirhead, Brian
Johnson Space Center/Altemus, Stephen J.
Johnson Space Center/Watkins, Bobby J.
Kennedy Space Center/Wiley, Warren I.
Kennedy Space Center/Simpkins, Pat
Langley Research Center/Sandford, Stephen P.
Marshall Space Flight Center/Rudolphi, Michael U.
Stennis Space Center/Hebert, Bartt J.
Stennis Space Center/Rodriguez, Miguel A.
HQ/Scolese, Christopher J.
HQ/Robinson, Gregory L
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HQ/Roe, Ralph R.
HQ/Lyles, Garry
HQ/Fishkind, Stanley
HQ/Ledbetter, Kenneth W.
HQ/Oconnor, Bryan
HQ/Ross, Harriet
HQ/Weinstein, Richard
HQ/Sorrels, Carrie
Ames Research Center/Umneel B. Mehta
Glenn Research Center/Jeffrey (Jeff) J. Rusick
Goddard Space Flight Center/Thomas (Tom) V. McCarthy
Johnson Space Center/Galen P. Overstreet
Kennedy Space Center/Martin J. Steele
Langley Research Center/Steve R. Blattnig
Langley Research Center/Richard (Dick) E. Davis
Langley Research Center/Lawrence L. Green
Langley Research Center/James M. Luckring
Langley Research Center/Joseph (Joe) H. Morrison
Langley Research Center/Ram K. Tripathi
Langley Research Center/Thomas (Tom) Zang
Marshall Space Flight Center/Maninderpal (Paul) Gill
Marshall Space Flight Center/Joe Hale
Stennis Space Center/Jody Woods
HQ/Richard (Dick) Weinstein
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Appendix B. Excerpts from the Space Shuttle Return to Flight
Report
In July 2005, the Space Shuttle RTF Task Group issued their report [ref. 2]. Annex A2 contained
numerous concerns about the use of M&S. The following are some excerpts from that report
(bold face not in original but used here to highlight important points):
"Standard engineering practice calls for objectives (requirements and interface
definitions) to be established prior to development for any model or system of models,
and processes and criteria defined for validating and verifying the model's results....
Initially, we did not observe these normal processes being followed during the
development of these models ..."
"The uncertainties in one model (or system) inherently feeds into and compounds the
uncertainty in the second model (or system), and so on. It appears, however, that NASA
largely designed these five classes of models without the attention to the
interdependencies between the models necessary for a complete understanding of the
end-to-end result. Understanding the characteristics of, and validating and verifying, one
type of model without examining the implications for the end-to-end result is not
sufficient.... But, as the Columbia accident showed, in a high risk environment that
involves many unknowns like human space flight, experience and instinct are poor
substitutes for careful analysis of uncertainty."
"... during the return-to-flight effort, there has been an enormous expenditure of time and
resources - amounting to tens of millions of dollars - without the discipline of a formal
development plan, clear objectives, explicit plans for verification and validation,
thorough outside review, documented ICDs between models, or a good understanding of
the limitations of analytical systems employing multiple, linked deterministic models.
Validation and verification planning has been left to the end of the process rather than the
beginning.... Analytical models have essentially driven the return-to-flight effort;
however, industry and academic standards and methods for developing, verifying, and
validating the models have not been used. In addition, no sensitivity analyses had been
conducted and no empirical data from flight history had been incorporated in the models
or their validation"
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Appendix C. ARC Topic Working Group Member's Objections
to the Interim M&S Standard
Minority Report
Unmeel B. Mehta
October 11, 2006
Summary
1. The degree of accuracy of simulation results is not assessed. The stated goals and Chris
Scolese's priority requirement - "Clearly credibility of results is the requirement" (08/31/06) –
require assessment of accuracy of simulation results. The credibility of simulation capability is
assessed. There should be two scales—one for credibility of simulation results and the other for
credibility of simulation capability.
2. The conversion from scale A2 or A3 to the summary scale is not judicious. The definitions of
levels in Section 4.7.1 do not properly represent the result of assessment in Appendix A.
3. Scales A2 and A3 have different assessment items and different definitions for levels. Only
one scale must be used in Appendix A for consistency.
4. Requirement 4.8.3-c is inappropriate. The exercise of this requirement significantly diminishes
the worth of this standard because the stated goals are not addressed.
Supporting Information
Section 4.7
1. Chris Scolese wants to know the bottom line – the credibility of simulation results – "Clearly
credibility of results is the requirement" (Aug. 31, 2006). He requested that a scale be developed
to provide the level of credibility of simulation results – the rigor scale. The stated goals of the
standard are for the credibility of simulation results. Section 4.7 does not address the degree of
accuracy of the M&S result, but it addresses the degree to which the accuracy of the M&S result
is known. The latter leads to the credibility of M&S capability. The reproducibility of results and
the repeatability of the process are also addressed. Hence, this section deals with "Assessing the
Credibility of M&S Capability." Again, Chris needs to know what is the credibility of simulation
results presented to him - that is, the degree of accuracy of those results.
2. Both A.2.3 and A.3.4 require reporting of the lowest score achieved as the summary
assessment (Requirement 4.7.1). That could lead to an inappropriate conclusion for simulation
result credibility. For example, if "Process Control" and other categories in Figure A.2.2-1 were,
respectively, Level 1 (red) and Level 4 (green), then the summary result would be labeled as "1"
(red).
Appendix A.1
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1. The number of categories and definitions of levels appreciably differ in scales A2 and A3.
Only one multi-dimensional scale should be provided to assess the simulation capability.
2. The definitions for levels used in scales A2 and A3 are not the same, and these definitions do
not correspond to those in Section 4.7.1. A number from 1 to 4 is reported to section 4.7.1 from
A2 (Appendix A.2.3) or A3 (Appendix A.3.4), and this number assumes the meaning provided
for that number in Section 4.7.1. The judiciousness of this mapping is questionable. For example,
A3 mentions "peer review" at Level 3 for 14 of 15 categories and "external audit" at Level 4 for
8 of 15 categories. Other levels in A3 do not use the word "review." Section 4.7.1 labels Level 4
as "endorsed." In this section, at each level the word "reviewed" is used. This example exhibits a
serious inconsistency in mapping from multi-dimensional assessment to a summary one-
dimensional assessment. Likewise, "working, in progress," the Level 1 definition for 14
categories of A3 (or "ad hoc" the definition of Level 1 for 6 categories of A2) is not same as
"Research" (Level 1) defined in Section 4.7.1. If Level 1 is achieved in all categories of A2 or
A3, then the summary definition of Level 1 cannot be as defined.
3. The definition of each level contains the word "uncertainty" (Section 4.7.1). However,
Requirement 4.8.3 allows for the option of stating that no quantitative or qualitative value of
uncertainty is available. The exercise of this option makes the summary credibility scale
significantly less useful, and drastically diminishes the worth of this standard for achieving the
stated goals. Note that AIAA Editorial Policy Statement on Numerical and Experimental
Accuracy (January 1994) states that "the AIAA journals will not accept for publication any
manuscript reporting numerical solutions of an engineering problem that fails to adequately
address the accuracy of the computed results or experimental results unless the accuracy of the
data is adequately presented." NASA's programs (costing millions to billions of dollars) must
mandate reporting of simulation uncertainties and test uncertainties for all simulation-based and
test-based decisions affecting safety and/or mission success. The option offered in Requirement
4.8.3-c is unacceptable.
Appendix A.2
1. "Adequacy of the M&S results for the desired application depends on requirements and
detailed knowledge of the specific application; adequacy is not addressed in this section." This
statement also confirms the assertion that Section 4.7 and A2 assess the M&S capability, but not
the credibility of simulation results for intended uses. Adequacy is relevant. For example,
validation cannot be conducted, if numerical uncertainties are comparable or larger than
uncertainties in experimental data. Chris needs to know the credibility of simulation results
presented to him. Additionally, the word "validation" is defined with the phrase "from the
perspective of the intended uses of the model" (page 11). A2 eliminates this phrase. Specific
applications or intended uses are not addressed.
2. Just because Level 4, as defined, is achieved for solution verification, does that mean that
simulation results are credible for the intended uses? Similar questions are asked for validation,
NESC Request No.: 06-005-E
NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:0 Technical Report  RP-08-118 1.0
Title: Pale #:
M&S Standard Completion 74 of 112
predictive capability, and technical review. Again, just because a formal external review is
conducted does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that simulation results are credible for the
intended uses. The outcome of this review determines the credibility of simulation result. As
defined, Levels 1 to 4 indicate increase in credibility of M&S capability. Processes are assessed.
Appendix A.3
1. A3 has three basic items (a) Is it built for the intended use ju)? (b) Is it well built (BW)? (c)
Is it used right (UR)'? Item (a) provides M&S capability assessment for the intended uses. Item
(b) determines process maturity by addressing the quality of the constriction of the M&S. Item
(c) assesses how well M&S was used for intended uses, including operator/analyst proficiency.
Essentially, simulation capability, including simulation processes and use of capability, is
assessed. How is the credibility (accuracy) of simulation results determined from these
assessments? Instead of the considered three axes, only one axis labeled "Are Uncertainties
Quantified?" or "Are simulation results credible?" is relevant to assess credibility of simulation
results for intended uses.
2. The linkage between the three dimensions N, BW, UR and the levels in the Summary
Credibility Scale is provided. However, the equivalence of the definitions of levels in A3 and
those in the Summary Scale or the justification that the definitions of levels in the Summary
Scale correctly represent the result of assessment with scale A3 is missing.
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Appendix D. Consequence Definitions from NPR 8000.4
NPR 8000.4 was undergoing revision as the task was completed. Since the revised version of this
NPR may not have the same (or any) risk matrix that was used as the basis of the Consequence
definitions which appear in Appendix A of the M&S Standard (discussed here in Section 7.6.2),
we record here the verbatim text of Section 2.3.1.1 of the version of NPR 8000.4 that had an
effective date of April 25, 2002.
2.3.1.1 Consequence.
Consequence is an assessment of the worst credible potential resrrlt(s) of a risk. The
measurement emits differ depending on the specific risk. For example, the consequence of a cost
risk may correspond to specific dollar amounts or percentages of the program/project budget or-
the consequence of schedule risks may correspond to the length of time delays. Consequence
classifications are defined generally as Catastrophic, Critical, Marginal, and Negligible. A
sample classification approach might  be as follows
a. Class I - Catastrophic. A condition that may cause death or- permanently disabling injury,
facility destruction on the ground, or loss of crew, major systems, or vehicle di.rring the mission;
schedule slippage causing launch window to be missed; cost overran greater than 50 percent of
planned cost.
b. Class II - Critical. A condition that may cause severe injury or occupational illness, or major°
property damage to facilities, systems, equipment, or flight hardware; schedule slippage causing
launch date to be missed; cost overrun bet>n- ,een 15 percent and not exceeding 50 percent of
planned cost).
c. Class III - Moderate. A condition that may cause minor injury or occupational illness, or
minor property damage to facilities, systems, equipment, or flight hardware; internal schedule
slip that does not impact launch date; cost over •rrrn between 2 percent and not exceeding 15
percent of planned cost.
d. Class IV - Negligible. A condition that could cause the need for minor first aid treatment but
would not adversely affect personal safety or health; damage to facilities, equipment, or flight
hardware more than normal wear and tear level; internal schedi.de  slip that does not impact
internal development milestones; cost overrun less than 2 percent ofplanned cost.
Note: The portions of these classifications concerning safety are defined within NPR 8715.3,
"NASA Safety Manual.
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Appendix E. Traceability Matrix
The first matrix below provides a mapping from the Agency-level decisions that initiated
development of this standard to the specific requirements in the M&S Standard. The driving
objectives were taken from Diaz Action #4 plus the direction from the NASA Chief Engineer to
include the credibility assessment scale.
For the six objectives in columns 2-7, which were taken from Diaz Action #4, green fill color
indicates that that M&S Standard requirement has a strong correlation with the driving objective,
and yellow fill color indicates a modest correlation. A green color appears in the last column
only if the entire requirement is driven solely by the credibility assessment scale, and a yellow
color indicates that a portion of the requirement is driven solely by the credibility assessment
scale. In the latter case, the portion of the requirement driven by the credibility assessment scale
is highlighted in yellow in the first column.
The traceability of a half-dozen recommendations is also provided in the second matrix. These
particular recommendations tie directly to one or more of the explicit objectives of Diaz Action
#4. However, these were deemed not suitable for requirements because they were not always
achievable.
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Requirements knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and v hen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
assurance unrealistic n
Req. 4.1.1 — Shall document
the risk assessment for any Y Y G Y Y YM&S used in critical
decisions.
Req. 4.1.2 — Shall identify
and document those M&S Y Y G Y Y Y
that are in scope.
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Requirements knowledge of
operations is
captured in the
user interfaces
tool
verification
and validation,
certification,
documentation,
configuration
management,
and quality
assurance
training or
certification
requirements
tool
management,
maintenance, and
obsolescence
user
feedback
when results
appear
unrealistic n
method to
assess the
credibility of
the M&S
Req. 4.1.3 — Shall define the
objectives and requirements
for M&S products including
the following
a. The acceptance criteria for
M&S products, including
any endorsement for the
M&S.
b. The rationale for the weights
used for the subfactors in
the credibility assessment G G G Yscale (see Appendix B.4).
c. Intended use.
d. Metrics (programmatic and
technical).
e. Verification, validation, and
uncertainty quantification(see section 4.4).
f. Reporting of M&S
information for critical
decisions (see section 4.8).
g. CM (artifacts, timeframe,
processes) of M&S.
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Requirements knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and Evhen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
assurance unrealistic n
Req. 4.1.4 — Shall develop a
plan (including identifying the
responsible organization(s))
for the acquisition, Y Gdevelopment, operation,
maintenance, and/or
retirement of the M&S.
Req. 4.1.5 — Shall document
any technical reviews
performed in the areas of
Verification, Validation, Input r+
VPedigree, Results
Uncertainty, and Results
Robustness (see Appendix
B).
Req. 4.1.6 — Shall document r+
V
Y
M&S waiver processes.
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Requirements knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and Evhen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
assurance unrealistic n
Req. 4.1.7 — Shall document
the extent to which an M&S
effort exhibits the
characteristics of work
product management,
process definition, process Y
measurement, process
control, process change, and
continuous improvement,
including CM and M&S
support and maintenance.
Req. 4.2.1 — Shall document
the assumptions and
abstractions underlying the Y ^+V Y
conceptual model, including
their rationales.
Req. 4.2.2 — Shall document
the basic structure and
mathematics of the model(e.g., reality modeled, G Y
equations solved, behaviors
modeled, conceptual
models).
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Requirements knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and Evhen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
assurance unrealistic n
Req. 4.2.3 — Shall document
data sets and any supporting
software used in model G Y
development and input
preparation.
Req. 4.2.4 — Shall document
required units and vector
coordinate frames (where r+
V
Y
applicable) for all
input/output variables in the
M&S.
Req. 4.2.5 — Shall document
the limits of operation of G Y
models.
Req. 4.2.6 — Shall document
any methods of uncertainty
quantification and the r+
V
Y
uncertainty in any data used
to develop the model or
incorporated into the model.
Req. 4.2.7 — Shall document
guidance on proper use of G Y Y
the model.
NESC Request No.: 06-005-E
NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: version:
0 Technical Report RP-08-118 1.0
Title: Page #:
M&S Standard Completion 82 of 112
Requirements knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and Evhen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
assurance unrealistic n
Req. 4.2.8 — Shall document
any parameter calibrations r+
V
Y
and the domain of
calibration.
Req. 4.2.9 — Shall document
updates of the model (e.g.,
solution adjustment, change
of parameters, calibration, G' Y Yand test cases) and assign
unique version identifier,
description, and the
justification for the update
Req. 4.2.10 — Shall
document obsolescence Y r+Vcriteria and obsolescence
date of the model.
Req. 4.2.11 — Shall provide a
feedback mechanism for
users to report unusual G
results to model developers
or maintainers.
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Requirements knowledge of
operations is
captured in the
user interfaces
tool
verification
and validation,
certification,
documentation,
configuration
management,
and quality
assurance
training or
certification
requirements
tool
management,
maintenance, and
obsolescence
user
feedback
Evhen results
appear
unrealistic n
method to
assess the
credibility of
the M&S
Req. 4.2.12 — Shall maintain
(conceptual, mathematical
and computational) models vi r+Vand associated
documentation in a
controlled CM system.
Req. 4.2.13 — Shall maintain
the data sets and supporting
software referenced in Req. vi r+V4.2.3 and the associated
documentation in a
controlled CM system.
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Requirements knowledge of
operations is
captured in the
user interfaces
tool
verification
and validation,
certification,
documentation,
configuration
management,
and quality
assurance
training or
certification
requirements
tool
management,
maintenance, and
obsolescence
user
feedback
Evhen results
appear
unrealistic n
method to
assess the
credibility of
the M&S
Req. 4.3.1 — Shall do either
of the following
a. Ensure that simulations
are conducted within the
limits of operation of the
models, or
b. Placard the simulation
and analysis results with
a warning that the
simulation may have r+
been conducted outside V
the limits of operation
and include the type of
limit that may have been
exceeded, the extent
that the limit might have
been exceeded, and an
assessment of the
consequences of this
action on the M&S
results.
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Requirements knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and Evhen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
assurance unrealistic n
Req. 4.3.2 — Shall document
and explain any observed
warning and error messages G
resulting from the execution
of the computational model.
Req. 4.3.3 — Shall document
which computational models r+
were used (including revision V
numbers) in the simulation.
Req. 4.3.4 — Shall document r+
the versions of M&S results. V
Req. 4.3.5 — Shall document
data used as input to the vi r+V
visimulation, including its
pedigree (see Appendix B).
Req. 4.3.6 — Shall document
any unique computational
requirements (e.g., support vi r+Vsoftware, main memory, disk
capacities, processor,
compilation options).
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Requirements knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and Evhen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
assurance unrealistic n
Req. 4.3.7 — Shall document
the processes for conducting
simulations and analyses for Y G
generating results reported
to decision makers.
Req. 4.3.8 — Shall document
the use history of M&S in the
same or similar applications,
which are relevant for G
establishing the credibility of
the current M&S application
(see Appendix B).
Req. 4.3.9 — Shall document
the assessment as to the
appropriateness of the G
simulation and analysis
relative to its intended use.
Req. 4.3.10 — Shall
document the rationale for
the setup and execution of
the simulation and analysis.
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Requirements knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and Evhen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
assurance unrealistic n
Req. 4.4.1 — Shall document
any verification techniques
used and any domain of r+
V
viverification (e.g., the
conditions under which
verification was conducted).
Req. 4.4.2 — Shall document
any numerical error
estimates (e.g., numerical
approximations, insufficient
discretization, insufficient G Yiterative convergence, finite-
precision arithmetic) for the
results of the computational
model.
Req. 4.4.3 — Shall document
the verification status of r+
V
Y
(conceptual, mathematical
and computational) models.
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Requirements knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and Evhen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
assurance unrealistic n
Req. 4.4.4 — Shall document
any techniques used to
validate the M&S for its
intended use, including the G Y Y
experimental design and
analysis, and the domain of
validation.
Req. 4.4.5 — Shall document
any validation metrics and r+
V Y Yreferents, and data sets used
for model validation.
Req. 4.4.6 — Shall document
any studies conducted and G Y Y
results of model validation.
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Requirements knowledge of
operations is
captured in the
user interfaces
tool
verification
and validation,
certification,
documentation,
configuration
management,
and quality
assurance
training or
certification
requirements
tool
management,
maintenance, and
obsolescence
user
feedback
Evhen results
appear
unrealistic n
method to
assess the
credibility of
the M&S
Req. 4.4.7 — Shall document
any uncertainty quantification
processes used for the
following
a. The referent data.
b. The input data. Y
c. The M&S results.
d. The propagation of
uncertainties.
e. The quantities derived
from M&S results
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Requirements knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and Evhen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
assurance unrealistic n
Req. 4.4.8 — Shall document
any quantified uncertainties,
both physical and numerical,
including the following
a. The referent data.
b. The input data. G Y
c. The M&S results.
d. The propagation of
uncertainties.
e. The quantities derived
from M&S results-
Req. 4.4.9 — Shall document
the extent and results of any r±
V
Y
sensitivity analyses
performed with the M&S.
Req. 4.5.1 — Shall identify
and document the
Recommended Practices G Y Y
that apply to M&S for the
program/project.
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Requirements knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and Evhen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
assurance unrealistic n
Req. 4.6.1 — Shall determine
the depth of required training r+
for developers, operators, V
and analysts
Req. 4.6.2 — Shall document
a. Training topics required
for developers,
operators, and analysts v
iof M&S.
b. Process and criteria for
verifying that training
requirements are met.
Req. 4.6.3 — Shall determine
the qualifications for
developers, operators, and
analysts.
Req. 4.7.1 — Shall assess
the credibility of M&S results
for each of the eight factors
in the credibility assessment
scale described in
Appendices B.2 and B.3.
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Requirements knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and Evhen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
assurance unrealistic n
Req. 4.7.2 — Shall justify and
document the credibility
assessment for each of the G
eight factors referenced in
Req. 4.7.1.
Req. 4.7.3 — Shall perform
the roll-up to an overall score r+
according to the process V
described in Appendix B.4.
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Requirements knowledge of
operations is
captured in the
user interfaces
tool
verification
and validation,
certification,
documentation,
configuration
management,
and quality
assurance
training or
certification
requirements
tool
management,
maintenance, and
obsolescence
user
feedback
Evhen results
appear
unrealistic n
method to
assess the
credibility of
the M&S
Req. 4.8.1 — Reports to
decision makers shall
include explicit warnings for
any of the following
occurrences, accompanied
by at least a qualitative
estimate of the impact of the
occurrence
a. Any unachieved
acceptance criteria (as
specified in Req. 4.1.3
(a))-
b. Violation of any
assumptions of any
model (as specified in
Req. 4.2.1).
V
G
V
G
c.	 Violation of the limits of
operation (as specified in
Req. 4.2.5).
d. Execution warning and
error messages (see
Req. 4.3.2).
e. Unfavorable outcomes
from the intended use
and setup/execution
assessments (described
vF^ln Req.4, 3,9 and	 eqf
4.3.10).
f.	 Waivers to any of the
requirements in this
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Requirements knowledge of
operations is
captured in the
user interfaces
tool
verification
and validation,
certification,
documentation,
configuration
management,
and quality
assurance
training or
certification
requirements
tool
management,
maintenance, and
obsolescence
user
feedback
Evhen results
appear
unrealistic n
method to
assess the
credibility of
the M&S
Req. 4.8.2 — Reports to
decision makers of M&S
results shall include an
estimate of their uncertainty
and a description of any
processes used to obtain this
estimate as defined in Req.
4.4.7 and Req. 4.4.8.
a. Reported uncertainty
estimate shall include
one of the following
(1) A quantitative estimate
of the uncertainty in the
M&S results, or
(2) A qualitative estimate of
the uncertainty in the
M&S results, or
(3) A clear statement that
no quantitative or
qualitative estimate of
uncertainty is available.
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Requirements knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and Evhen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
assurance unrealistic n
Req. 4.8.3 - Reports to
decision makers shall
include the level of credibility
for M&S results and the G
subfactor weights, using the
process specified in section
4.7.
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Critical Recommendations knowledge of
operations is
captured in the
user interfaces
tool
verification
and validation,
certification,
documentation,
configuration
management,
and quality
assurance
training or
certification
requirements
tool
management,
maintenance, and
obsolescence
user
feedback
Evhen results
appear
unrealistic n
method to
assess the
credibility of
the M&S
Rec. 4.3b: CM records
should contain test cases
that span the limits of
operation for the M&S
defined by the program or r±G vi"Testproject.	 cases" are
defined as benchmark
input/output sets used to
verify proper execution of the
M&S.
Rec. 4.3c: The simulation
should fail in a manner that
prevents misuse and
misleading results.
(1) The simulation should
provide messages that detail
the failure mode and point of G G i
failure.
(2) The analyst should
document and explain all
failure modes, points of
failure, and messages
indicating such failures.
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assurance unrealistic n
Rec 4.5j: Recommended
Practices for the following
should be identified:
Identify best practices for r+
user interface design to V
constrain the operation of the
simulation to within its limits
of operations.
Rec. 4.6a: Recommended
training topics for
developers, operators, and r+
V
vianalysts of M&S include: The
intended use of limits of
operation for models.
Rec. 4.6d: Recommended
training topics for
developers, operators, and r+
analysts of M&S include: V
How to recognize unrealistic
results from simulations.
Rec. 4.6e: Recommended
training topics for
developers, operators, and i V
analysts of M&S include:
Feedback processes to
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Critical Recommendations knowledge of tool documentation, training or tool user method to
operations is verification configuration certification management, feedback assess the
captured in the and validation, management, requirements maintenance, and Evhen results credibility of
user interfaces certification, and quality obsolescence appear the M&S
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improve M&S processes and
results, including providing
feedback for results that are
not credible, are unrealistic,
or defy explanation.
NESC Request No.: 06-005-E
NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document Version:
0
RP-08-118 1.0Technical Report
Title:	 M&S Standard Completion Page #:99 of 117
Appendix F. Pilot Scale Questionnaire
Background
This survey is intended to collect feedback on the Simulation Credibility Scale described in
Section 4.7 and Appendix A of the [Interim] NASA Standard for Models and Simulations. The
primary goal of the M&S Standard is to ensure that the credibility of the results from models and
simulations is properly conveyed to those making critical decisions based in part on the M&S
results.
For example, suppose that the setting is a Flight Readiness Review, and that the decision-makers
are confronted with conflicting results for different simulations. For example, suppose that both
Organization A and Organization B have performed analyses using M&S for this flight, and that
the results from the M&S of Organization A predict a 1 in 20 chance of failure, whereas the
results from the M&S of Organization B predict a 1 in 200 change of failure. The decision-maker
is faced with deciding which M&S result to believe, i.e., which result is more "credible." The
purpose of the Simulation Credibility Scale is to provide an objective means to make this
assessment.
Developing such a scale is not simple. The Interim M&S Standard for Models and Simulations
represents the initial thinking on this subject. The Topic Working Group for this Standard is
keenly interested in feedback from M&S practitioners and decision-makers in order to develop a
better scale for the Permanent M&S Standard.
The philosophy behind the scale in the Interim M&S Standard is expressed as follows at the
start of Section 4.7: "Credibility assessments of M&S results address, in order of importance, the
degree to which the accuracy of a result is known, the reproducibility of the results, and the
repeatability of the process. In this section, credibility includes the degree to which the accuracy
of the M&S result is known and not the degree of accuracy of the M&S result. Any measure of
the achieved degree of accuracy of Ill&S results as compared to the required degree of accuracy
is highly dependent on the specifics of the problem. "
In Questions 17 and 23, you have the opportunity to critique this philosophy. Please respond to
the remaining questions (1-16 and 17-22) in the context of the above philosophy.
Instructions
Please provide some background information on your M&S project and then provide the specific
feedback requested below. At a later time, an additional survey will be taken that solicits
feedback on other aspects of the Interim M&S Standard.
The term "level' refers to the "Credibility Levels" as used in Appendix A. The term "category"
refers to the "credibility categories" as used in Appendix A2 and "credibility criteria" as used in
Appendix A3.
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Your M&S project may consist of just a single model or of multiple models that are coupled or
linked together. Part of the feedback concerns how well the scales work for results from an
individual model, and part with how well the scales work for coupled models.
Please respond to the multiple-choice questions with the answer that most closely matches your
opinion.
M&S Project Information
Name of M&S Program/Project
Type of M&S Use (see Tables I and 2)
a. Operations
b. Manufacturing, Assembly, Test, and Evaluation
C.	 Design and Analysis
d. Natural Phenomena Prediction
e. Technology Investment
f. Scientific Data Analysis
g. Scientific Understanding
h. Training and/or Education
i. M&S Research
J .	 other (describe)
Number of Workyears in Development
Number of Individual Models
Software Life-Cycle Model
a. waterfall (http://en.wikipedia.ora/wiki/Waterfall_ model)
b. iterative (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iterative_ and incremental_ development)
C.	 spiral (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spiral  model )
d. agile (http://en.wikipedia.ora/wiki/Agile software development)
e. other (describe)
Responder
Center:
Name:
Role on M&S Project:
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Questions
	1.	 How understandable is the Scale in Appendix A2?
a. I can understand the full Scale well enough to apply it simply by reading the
Interim M&S Standard. No coaching is required.
b. I can understand most but not all of the Scale just from reading the Interim M&S
Standard. However, in order for me to apply it, a modest amount of coaching is
required.
C.	 I cannot understand the Scale well enough to apply to without considerable
coaching.
d.	 I cannot understand the Scale, even with a substantial amount of coaching.
	
2.	 What, if any, parts of Scale A2 are not understandable or vague`?
	
3.	 How understandable is the Scale in Appendix AP
a. I can understand the full Scale well enough to apply it simply by reading the
Interim M&S Standard. No coaching is required.
b. I can understand most but not all of the Scale just from reading the Interim M&S
Standard. However, in order for me to apply it, a modest amount of coaching is
required.
C.	 I cannot understand the Scale well enough to apply it without considerable
coaching.
d.	 I cannot understand the Scale, even with a substantial amount of coaching.
	
4.	 What, if any, parts of Scale A3 are not understandable or vague`?
	
5.	 How easy is Scale A2 to score for a typical individual model in your M&S?
a. The Level Definitions are very clear: I can readily assign a unique level in each
category.
b. The Level Definitions are mostly clear: I can assign a unique level in most
categories, but in a minority of the categories, I am uncertain about which of 2
adjacent levels to choose.
C.	 The Level Definitions are vague: In most categories I am unclear which level to
choose.
d.	 The Level Definitions are meaningless: I have virtually no idea which level to
choose in any category.
	
6.	 How would you improve the Level Definitions for Scale A2? If you can improve, please
provide your definitions of Levels.
	
7.	 How easy is Scale A3 to score for a typical individual model in your M&S?
a.	 The Level Definitions are very clear: I can readily assign a unique level in each
category.
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b. The Level Definitions are mostly clear: I can assign a unique level in most
categories, but in a minority of the categories, I am uncertain about which of 2
adjacent levels to choose.
C.	 The Level Definitions are vague: In most categories I am unclear which level to
choose.
d.	 The Level Definitions are meaningless: I have virtually no idea which level to
choose in any category.
	
8.	 How would you improve the Level Definitions for Scale AP If you can improve, please
provide your definitions of Levels.
	
9.	 How well does Scale A2 work for coupled M&S? (By "coupled M&S" we mean
simulations that link/integrate multiple individual models.)
a. The Scale applies equally well in all categories to coupled models as to single
models.
b. The Scale applies equally well in the majority, but not all, of the categories to
coupled models as to single models.
C.	 Major changes are needed for the Scale to work for coupled M&S
d.	 The Scale cannot possibly work for coupled M&S
	
10.	 How well does Scale A3 work for coupled M&S? (By "coupled M&S" we mean
simulations that link/integrate multiple individual models.)
a. The Scale applies equally well in all categories to coupled models as to single
models.
b. The Scale applies equally well in the majority, but not all, of the categories to
coupled models as to single models.
C.	 Major changes are needed for the Scale to work for coupled M&S
d.	 The Scale cannot possibly work for coupled M&S
	
11.	 Does the result of applying Summary Credibility Scale in Section 4.7 based on the result
of the scale in Appendix A2 provide the decision-maker with a useful measure of
credibility of the results of M&S?
a. The result provides an excellent measure of credibility.
b. The result provides a good measure of credibility.
C.	 The result provides a poor measure of credibility, but can be modified to provides a
good measure of credibility
d.	 The result provides a poor measure of credibility, and a completely different
approach is required.
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12.	 Does the result of applying Summary Credibility Scale in Section 4.7 based on the result
of the scale in Appendix A3 provide the decision-maker with a useful measure of
credibility of the results of M&S?
a. The result provides an excellent measure of credibility.
b. The result provides a good measure of credibility.
C.	 The result provides a poor measure of credibility, but can be modified to provides a
good measure of credibility
d.	 The result provides a poor measure of credibility, and a completely different
approach is required.
	
13.	 Given the first paragraph of Section 4.7, the Summary Credibility Scale, and the recipe to
go from scale A2 to the Summary Scale, how well is the primary goal of the M&S
Standard satisfied? [The primary goal is to ensure that the credibility of the results from
models and simulations is properly conveyed to those making critical decisions]
a. The Scale does an excellent job of satisfying the primary goal.
b. The Scale does a good job of satisfying the primary goal.
C.	 The Scale does a poor job of satisfying the primary goal, but can be modified to do
a good job.
d.	 The Scale does a poor job of satisfying the primary goal, and a completely different
approach is required.
	
14.	 Given the first paragraph of Section 4.7, the Summary Credibility Scale, and the recipe to
go from scale A3 to the Summary Scale, how well is the primary goal of the M&S
Standard satisfied? [The primary goal is to ensure that the credibility of the results from
models and simulations is properly conveyed to those making critical decisions]
a. The Scale does an excellent job of satisfying the primary goal.
b. The Scale does a good job of satisfying the primary goal.
C.	 The Scale does a poor job of satisfying the primary goal, but can be modified to do
a good job.
d.	 The Scale does a poor* ob of satisfying the primary goal, and a completely different
approach is required.
15. How well does Summary Credibility Scale based on the scale in Appendix A2 satisfy the
secondary goal of the M&S Standard`? [The secondary goal is to assure that the credibility
of the results from M&S meets the project requirements]
a. The Scale does an excellent job of satisfying the secondary goal.
b. The Scale does a good job of satisfying the secondary goal.
C.	 The Scale does a poor job of satisfying the secondary goal, but can be modified to
do a good job.
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d.	 The Scale does a poor job of satisfying the secondary goal, and a completely
different approach is required.
	
16.	 How well does the Summary Credibility Scale based on the scale in Appendix A3 satisfy
the secondary goal of the M&S Standard'? [The secondary goal is to assure that the
credibility of the results from M&S meets the project requirements]
a. The Scale does an excellent job of satisfying the secondary goal.
b. The Scale does a good job of satisfying the secondary goal.
C.	 The Scale does a poor job of satisfying the secondary goal, but can be modified to
do a good job.
d.	 The Scale does a poor job of satisfying the secondary goal, and a completely
different approach is required.
	
17.	 What are the categories that most contribute (in your mind) to the credibility of
simulation results presented to the decision-maker? [Include in your response any related
comments you have on the philosophy that is italicized on p. 1 of this questionnaire.]
18. What is a good range for the number of distinct categories in a Scale? [The word
"category" means "credibility category" as used in Appendix A2 and "credibility
criterion" as used in Appendix A3.]
a. 1-2
b. 3-5
C.	 6-10
d.	 11-20
	
19.	 The scale in Appendix A3 has a hierarchical structure, whereas the scale in Appendix A2
is non-hierarchical. What is your opinion about the use of a hierarchical Scale'? (Ignore
the details of the categories and level definitions in these particular scales.)
a. I prefer a hierarchical scale
b. I do not have an opinion
C.	 I prefer a non-hierarchical scale
d.	 I don't under the distinction and need additional information
20. The Summary Credibility Scale (Section 4.7) produces a single number. The scales in
appendices A2 and A3 have multiple categories for each level. For producing a single
number from these multiple categories do you favor
a. Giving all categories equal weight
b. I do not have an opinion
C.	 Weighting some categories more than others
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21. The Summary Credibility Scale (Section 4.7) produces a single number. The scales in
appendices A2 and A3 have multiple categories for each level. For producing a single
number from these multiple categories do you favor
a. Choosing the minimum
b. Choosing the simple average
C.	 Choosing a weighted average
d. Reporting the mean, minimum and maximum over all the categories
	
22.	 Both the scales in appendices A2 and A3 use a color-coded scheme to report the
comparison with the required level and the achieved level in each category. A green-
yellow-red color coding is used to denote whether the achieved level is equal or greater
than, exactly one level less than, or two or more levels less than the required level.
a. This color coding is useful
b. I do not have an opinion
C.	 This color coding is not useful
	
23.	 What other comments would you care to make on the subject of the Simulation
Credibility Scale? [Include in your response any remaining comments you have on the
philosophy that is italicized on p. 1 of this questionnaire.]
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Appendix G. Decision Maker Interview Guide
M&S Credibility Interview Guide Introduction
Interviewee:
Title:
Telephone No
Interviewers:
Introduction
Date:
We are conducting interviews to examine some major M&S activities—both successes and
failures. The M&S activities of interest are those used to support program/project decisions that
affect human safety and mission success. We want to understand in each case what worked, what
did not work, and why. We are particularly interested in your thoughts on the major contributors
to the credibility of simulation results (fourth item above).
We can use your input in exploring one of those cases. To this end, could you comment on the
last major model/ simulation that you dealt with, with respect to the following areas? We intend
for this to take only a small amount of your time, but the more detail you can afford us, the better
the credibility communication system we can construct for your use.
[Note: This section also contained the Diaz Action #4 language and the list of objectives fr-oni
the 1VAS4 Chief Engineer inemo of Sept. 1, 2006.]
Interview Guide
1.	 Briefly describe the last important M&S model output you were asked to consider.
a. Case Name: (What was it? Commit to a particular instance.)
b. Please describe the overall project supported by the M&S activity. (Describe its
context in general terms.)
C.	 Briefly describe the system, disciplines or phenomena that were modeled.
(Describe the narrower context of the modeled system in general terms. Get enough information
that you can infer the general class–see attached appendix for a list of classes.)
d.	 What were the particular "results" of the M&S that were used to support the
decisions'? (What were the outputs you used, in specific terms?)
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e.	 Please describe the role of the M&S results in the decision. (How did you use the
outputs in the decision?)
	
2.	 We now would like to focus on the credibility of the results.
a. Were the M&S results credible? If so, why'? If not, why not'? (Identify the key
factors.)
b. How much time did you give to think about its credibility?
Did you have enough information to determine its credibility?
d. What additional infortation could you have used to determine its credibility?
e. Do you think it would have been possible to explore its credibility more fully,
given the time and resources available?
f. Please review this list offactors and idengfii% those that made a rnakor contribution
to the credibility or lack thereof of the M&S results. [This question is optional at the discretion
of the Center° Topic Working Group member. If this question is asked, (a) be sure to clearly
distinguish the answer to this question from the answer to #2a, and (b) use whatever •
 list you
deem appropriate.]
g. Would a credibility scale attached to an M&S output be useful to you'? (Closed
question; ask following if response is "yes")
h. What concerns do you have regarding a credibility scale?
	
3.	 Are there any other questions I should have asked'?
	
4.	 Is there anyone else I should speak with?
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Appendix H. Pilot Questionnaire
Instructions
This questionnaire seeks to obtain feedback on several key issues involving the M&S Standard.
Answers to the questions in Sections A-C are required. Responses to the questions in Sections D
are desirable but not required.
Please provide some background information on your M&S project and then provide the specific
feedback requested below.
Please respond to the multiple-choice questions with the answer that most closely matches your
opinion.
A. M&S Project Information
[Note: The same background information was collected as in the Pilot Scale Questionnaire
(Appendix E), and the following instructions were added to identify the baseline for the cost
estimates.]
M&S Project Baseline Cost
In Section B we are asking for your best estimate of the added cost to your M&S Project that
would result from compliance with the M&S Standard. We'd like your cost estimate to be
provided in percentage terms relative to your M&S Project Cost Baseline. Please provide this
M&S Project Cost Baseline in terms of either the annual full cost or the life-cycle full cost of the
M&S Project. Also provide a similar baseline for the entire program or project that your M&S
project supports. Furthermore, we'd like to know whether your M&S project started with
existing M&S or needed to develop new M&S capability as part of the development. Include
both the development and operation phases of the M&S project in the cost estimate.
Annual Cost Baseline
Annual full cost of M&S development & operation
Annual full cost of the major program or project supported by the M&S project
Life-cycle Cost Baseline
Life-cycle full cost of M&S development & operation
Life-cycle full cost of the major program or project supported by the M&S project
New or existing M&S?
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B. Achievement of Goals
The primary goal of this standard is to ensure that the credibility of the results from models and
simulations (M&S) is properly conveyed to those making critical decisions. This will support
risk-informed decisions. (By "critical decisions" we mean decisions that may affect human
safety or project-defined mission success criteria.)
The secondary goal is to assure that the credibility of the results from M&S meets the project
requirements. This will reduce the risks associated with critical decisions.
Since we have already collected your input on the Summary Credibility Scale (and the two
supporting versions detailed in Appendices A2 and A3), please respond to the questions in this
section without considering Section 4.7 and Appendix A.
How well is the primary goal of the M&S Standard satisfied?
a. The Standard does an excellent job of satisfying the primary goal.
b. The Standard does a good job of satisfying the primary goal.
C.	 The Standard does a poor job of satisfying the primary goal, but can be modified to
do a good job.
d.	 The Standard does a poor job of satisfying the primary goal, and a completely
different approach is required.
2.	 What aspects of the M&S Standard detract from achievement of the primary goal?
3.	 What aspects need to be added to the M&S Standard to achieve the primary goal?
4.	 How well is the secondary goal of the M&S Standard satisfied?
a. The Standard does an excellent job of satisfying the primary goal.
b. The Standard does a good job of satisfying the primary goal.
C.	 The Standard does a poor job of satisfying the primary goal, but can be modified to
do a good job.
d.	 The Standard does a poor job of satisfying the primary goal, and a completely
different approach is required.
5.	 What aspects of the M&S Standard detract from achievement of the secondary goal?
6.	 What aspects need to be added to the M&S Standard to achieve the secondary goal?
C.	 Cost-Benefit Analysis
The cost of complying with the M&S Standard can be strongly dependent upon the Simulation
Credibility Level that is required by the program. Hence, we are askin g the cost question with
respect to achieving specified levels of credibility. To achieve Credibility Level 1 requires one
merely to conform to the documentation and reporting requirements. This cost is independent of
whether one uses Scale A2 or Scale A3 to determine Credibility. The cost of achieving
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Credibility Levels 2-4 very likely does depend upon which Scale is used. In answering question
10 & 11, please pick either Scale A2 or Scale A3 as the basis for your answer.
A cost estimate such as this is very difficult to make. Therefore, we are asking you to supply 3
numbers for each cost estimate: the most likely cost, the minimum cost and the maximum cost.
Furthermore, state your cost numbers in percentage terins, using your M&S Project Cost
Baseline, as documented above, as the baseline for each answer. In particular, do not provide the
cost to achieve Level 3 Credibility as the incremental cost beyond achieving Level 1 Credibility.
Instead, give the total cost to reach Level 3 Credibility compared to the M&S Project Cost
Baseline.
7.	 Are your cost estimates based on Scale A2 or Scale A3?
8.	 What is the percentage additional cost (relative to the M&S Project Cost Baseline)
imposed by complying with the Standard at Level 1 Credibility?
a. maximum percentage cost increase
b. most likely percentage cost increase
C.	 minimum percentage cost increase
9.	 What aspects of the Standard are the major cost drivers for reaching Level 1?
10.	 What is the percentage additional cost (relative to the M&S Project Cost Baseline)
imposed by complying with the Standard at Level 3 Credibility`?
a. maximum percentage cost increase
b. most likely percentage cost increase
C.	 minimum percentage cost increase
11.	 What aspects of the Scale are the major cost drivers for reaching Level 3?
12.	 Describe any benefits that you believe will occur because of compliance with the
Standard (at Level 1 Credibility)
D.	 Optional Questions
Additional Cost Estimates
If you have the time to provide cost estimates for reaching Level 2 and Level 4 Credibility,
please do so in Questions 13-16. Use the same choice of Scale as noted above in Question 7 for
your answers.
13.	 What is the percentage additional cost (relative to the M&S Project Cost Baseline)
imposed by complying with the Standard at Level 2 Credibility`?
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a. maximum percentage cost increase
b. most likely percentage cost increase
C.	 minimum percentage cost increase
	
14.	 What aspects of the Scale are the major cost drivers for reaching Level 2?
	
15.	 What is the percentage additional cost (relative to the M&S Project Cost Baseline)
imposed by complying with the Standard at Level 4 Credibility`?
a. maximum percentage cost increase
b. most likely percentage cost increase
C.	 minimum percentage cost increase
	
16.	 What aspects of the Scale are the major cost drivers for reaching Level 4?
Clarity
Since we have already collected your input on the Summary Credibility Scale (and the two
supporting versions detailed in Appendices A2 and A3), please respond to the next 2 questions
without considering Section 4.7 and Appendix A.
	
17.	 How understandable is the Standard`?
a. I can understand the Standard well enough to apply it simply by reading it. No
coaching is required.
b. I can understand most but not all of the Standard just from reading it. However, in
order for me to apply it, a modest amount of coaching is required.
C.	 I cannot understand the Standard well enough to apply to without considerable
coaching.
d.	 I cannot understand the Standard, even with a substantial amount of coaching.
	
18.	 What, if any, parts of the Standard are not understandable or vague?
General Comments
	19.	 What other comments would you care to make on the subject of the M&S Standard?
Requirements Assessment
Ideally, each requirement in the Standard is
• Valid (necessary for the goals o the Standard)
• Verifiable (an independent part can detennine objectively whether the requirement was
met)
• Doable (achievable with sufficient training, time and money)
• Applicable (relevant to all types of M&S, e.g., empirical curve fits, partial differential
equations, discrete event simulation, operations models)
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